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MINNESOTA'S MORATORIUM ON
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE
ROLAND C. AMUNDSONt
& LEWIS J. ROTMANtt

The Minnesota Legislature has twice acted to provide rehef to morigagors
and contract vendees in economically hard times. The ejects of the Depression prompted a two-year moratorium on mortgageforeclosure which
was enacted in 1933 and extended untilJuly 1942. In response to the
current unemployment crisis and low farm commodiy prices, the Minnesota Legislature enacted the state's second moratorium in May 1983.
The legislature recently extended the moratoriumfor anotheryear. Professor Amundson and L.J. Rotman's thorough examination of these moratoria concludes with innovative considerationsfor providing more complete
relief to deserving homeowners andfarmers.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The legislature finds that the number of unemployed persons in
this state has reached the highest level since the Depression of
the 1930's; that farm commodity prices are below the breakeven point for the cost of production; that the number of mortgage loans currently in default due to the unemployment of the
principal wage earner has reached critical levels; and that by
reason of these conditions and the high rates of interest on
mortgage loans, many of the citizens of this state will be unable
for extended periods of time, to meet payments of taxes, interest, and principal of mortgages on their properties and are,
therefore, threatened with loss of their real property through
mortgage foreclosure, contract termination, and judicial sales.
The legislature further finds that these conditions have resulted
in an emergency of a nature that justifies and validates legislation for the extension of the time prior to foreclosure and execution sales and for other relief.
-Legislative Findings, Minnesota's
Moratorium on Mortgage Foreclosure1
1. Act of May 23, 1983, ch. 215, § 4, 1983 Minn. Laws 654, 654-55 (codified at
MINN. STAT.

§ 583.01 (Supp. 1983)).
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On May 23, 1983, the Minnesota Legislature addressed these
concerns by enacting a moratorium on mortgage foreclosure and
contract for deed termination 2 (Act). Although the Act originally
had only a thirteen-month duration, expiring on July 1, 1984, 3 the
legislature recently extended it for another year. 4 Notwithstand2. See Act of May 23, 1983, ch. 215, 1983 Minn. Laws 654.
3. See id. § 16, 1983 Minn. Laws at 658.
4. On April 19, 1984, near the end of the 1984 legislative session, the House of Representatives adopted a bill extending the Act until July 1, 1985 (1984 Legislation). See
1984 MINN. H.J. 9314-15. Governor Perpich signed the bill into law on April 25, 1984,
thus providing farmers and homeowners with another year of relief.
The 1984 Legislation makes three substantial changes to the Act. First, the legislation adds a notice provision. This provision will require foreclosing mortgagees and terminating contract for deed vendors to specify to defaulting mortgagors and contract vendees
that relief is available under the Act. See Act of Apr. 25, 1984, ch. 474, §§ 1-2, 1984 Minn.
Sess. Law Serv. 361, 361-62 (West) (to be codified at MINN. STAT. §§ 47.20, subd. 15,
559.21, subd. 6). The need for the notice provision is discussed 1n/7a notes 271-73 and
accompanying text. The 1984 Legislation also extends, from four to eight weeks, the time
in which notice of a foreclosure sale must be served on a defaulting homeowner or farmer.
See Act of Apr. 25, 1984, ch. 474, § 3, 1984 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 361, 362 (West) (to be
codified at MINN. STAT. § 580.031). The personal service requirement now mirrors the
publication requirement of eight weeks. See Act of May 23, 1983, ch. 215, § 3, 1983 Minn.
Laws 654, 654 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 580.031 (Supp. 1983)).
Another change to the Act is an additional factor which courts are encouraged to
consider in determining whether to order a delay in the sale of foreclosed property. The
1984 Legislation provides that courts will be able to consider that the petitioning homeowner or farmer is "facing catastrophic medical expenses." See Act of Apr. 25, 1984, ch.
474, § 5, 1984 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 361, 363 (West) (to be codified at MINN. STAT.
§ 583.05(1)). Standards for awarding relief under the Act are discussed infra notes 154-56
and accompanying text.
The final substantive addition made to the Act by the 1984 Legislation affects the
Act's provision for partial payment. See infra notes 176-84 and accompanying text. The
Act requires that the court order the defaulting farmer or homeowner to make some payment to the mortgagee or vendor during the period of relief. The 1984 Legislation encourages the court to consider the "equity in the property held by the mortgagor or contract
vendee" in determining the amount of partial payment. See Act of Apr. 25, 1984, ch. 474,
§ 6,1984 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 361, 364 (West) (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 583.08).
Noticeably absent from the 1984 Legislation are a number of provisions that were
considered during the session. Provisions to create a guaranty fund, infra notes 265-70 and
accompanying text, and to establish a method of reamortization, infra notes 238-40 and
accompanying text, were considered at one point or another. Similarly, a number of technical changes, which were contained in an earlier bill before the House of Representatives,
were not included in the final legislation. See, e.g., H.F. 2036 (first engrossment on file in
the William Mitchell Law Review office).
Undoubtedly, the concept of reamortization antagonized the lending institutions and
became too controversial to be introduced as an amendment. The guaranty fund, although not opposed by the banking industry, required an appropriation. Therefore, it
was difficult to garner support for the concept. The technical changes, however, were not
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ing the Act's limited duration, it raises concerns over its effect on
Minnesota real property law and its validity as a proper solution
to an emergency situation.
Exact statistics on mortgage foreclosures and contract for deed
terminations in the state were unavailable as the legislature contemplated passage of the Act. 5 National statistics, however, indicated an increasing number of mortgage defaults by farmers and
homeowners. 6 In response to this compounding problem, the moratorium was enacted. The result, however, was less than originally
intended by the Act's sponsors and far from comprehensive. 7
at all controversial and did not involve an appropriation. Rather, these important clarifications apparently slipped through the cracks in the legislative process, as the legislature
feverishly pursued adjournment.
5. Telephone interview with Mr. Roger Culhane, Coordinator, Home Preservation
Hotline, Minnesota Attorney General's Office (Dec. 22, 1983). The Attorney General's
Office operates a telephone hotline for persons faced with foreclosure or termination. The
coordinator of the project, Roger Culhane, channels callers to appropriate agencies for
assistance and provides them with copies of the Act and related information. The program commenced with the Act's passage. In its relatively short existence, the program has
received thousands of calls. See REPORT UPDATE: HOME PRESERVATION HOTLINE (Jan.
25, 1984) (on file in the William Mitchell Law Review office).
Since passage of the Act, foreclosures in at least one area of Minnesota, the "Iron
Range," have continued to increase. See Foreclosuresup in St. Louis County, Minneapolis Star
& Trib., Apr. 1, 1984, at 8B, col. 2. According to the county sheriff's records
"[f]oreclosures are up 233 percent ... since 1980, from 52 then to 173 last year. . . . The
sheriff served 30 foreclosure notices the first two months of this year [1984] .... ." Id.
Notwithstanding the depressed economy of the Iron Range, Minnesota's economy appears
to be on the rise overall. See Meyers, State's recovery moving now with gusto, Minneapolis Star
& Trib., Apr. 1, 1984, at 1D, col. 2 (relying on the Minnesota Index of Leading Economic
Indicators which reached its all-time high in January 1984).
6. In 1981, the number of mortgage foreclosures was nearly 30,000. See FED. HOME
LOAN BANK BD. J., Oct. 1982, at 39. The increase between 1980 and 1981 in the dollar
amount of delinquent mortgage loans was 31%. Dentzer, The Depression Syndrome, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 8, 1982, at 75. By the end of 1982, the number of residential foreclosures
across the country was at its highest level since 1952. Again, the Fearof Foreclosure, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 17, 1983, at 12.
Foreclosure is not just a threat to farmers or persons in low-income brackets. A recent
study by the Investors Mortgage Insurance Company indicated that "[h]igher-income
borrowers (defined as those earning $60,000 yearly and up) are nearly as likely to end up
in foreclosure as home buyers at the opposite end of the scale, those with annual incomes
of $18,000 or less." Foreclosurestudy shows high income not always sure bet, Minneapolis Star &
Trib., Mar. 31, 1984, at 1S, col. 1. Moreover, as a result of the widespread use of adjustable-rate mortgages in recent years, as the interest rate increases, these mortgagors may be
unable to make continued payments. See Climb in interest rates brings fear to booming house
market, Minneapolis Star & Trib., Apr. 7, 1984, at 3S, col. 2. Thus, persons holding adjustable-rate mortgages may fall victim to foreclosure in the years ahead.
7. See Knapp, Minnesota Foreclosure Relief Act. How It Wor/, I MINN. REAL EST. L.J.
190, 191-92 (1983). "As the bill proceeded through the legislative process, its provisions
were tempered, and the bill as finally enacted was more favorable to mortgagees and
contract-for-deed vendors than the bill originally introduced." Id at 192.
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As a model for the Act, the legislature used the 1933 Minnesota
moratorium on mortgage foreclosure 8 (1933 Legislation).
Designed to ward off the harsh effects of the Depression, 9 the 1933
Legislation survived a constitutional challenge in the United
States Supreme Court in Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell '0 The 1983 Act was also enacted in response to a perceived
emergency, albeit an emergency entirely distinct from the crisis
existing during the Depression."
Following a review of Minnesota's procedures on contract for
deed termination and mortgage foreclosure, this Article discusses
the history of moratory legislation, focusing on Minnesota's first
moratorium on mortgage foreclosure. The Article then addresses
the specific provisions of the Act, analyzing the standards for review under the Act and suggesting more detailed criteria for determining eligibility for relief. It also focuses on the concept of
"partial payment" required by the Act and suggests an alternative
approach. The Article raises concern over the Act's impact on
Minnesota's real property law and concludes with several additional considerations for a continued moratorium in Minnesota
and for moratoria in"
other jurisdictions.
II.

MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE AND CONTRACT FOR DEED
TERMINATION PROCEDURES

The Act changed various aspects of Minnesota's traditional
mortgage foreclosure and contract for deed termination procedures. Before addressing these changes, this Article examines the
8. See Act of Apr. 18, 1933, ch. 339, 1933 Minn. Laws 514. The 1933 Legislation
provided that a defaulting mortgagor could petition the district court to issue an ex parte
order postponing foreclosure. Id pt. I, § 2, 1933 Minn. Laws at 516. If foreclosure had
already been commenced, the court could extend the period of redemption. Id § 4, 1933
Minn. Laws at 517.
9. Many of the harsh effects of the Depression are set out in the Preamble to the
1933 Legislation. See, e.g., id 1933 Minn. Laws at 514-15. As the United States Supreme
Court noted in construing the 1933 Legislation, "the economic emergency which
threatened 'the loss of homes and lands which furnish those in possession the necessary
shelter and means of subsistence' was a 'potent cause' for the enactment of the statute."
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 445 (1934).
10. 189 Minn. 422, 249 N.W. 334 (1933), aj'd, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
11. See Knapp, supra note 7, at 199. The presence of an emergency is an essential
factor in justifying a state's impairment of individuals' contract rights under article I,
section 10 of the United States Constitution. Although the Act raises this same constitutional concern, discussion of the constitutionality of the Act is beyond the scope of this
Article. For a discussion of this issue, see id at 198-99; infra note 120 and accompanying
text (discussing five essential criteria for upholding moratoria legislation). See generaly
Annot., 86 A.L.R. 1539 (1933) (discussing judicial treatment of moratoria legislation).
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procedures as they existed prior to the Act in order to measure the
Act's impact more comprehensively.
A.

Contractfor Deed Termination

The contract for deed is a popular substitute' 2 for the conventional mortgage.' 3 Under a contract for deed, the vendor retains4
title to the property while relinquishing possession to the vendee. '
12. There are a number of advantages in using a contract for deed as a security device to convey property. In a residential setting, the advantages generally are: (1) transactions may often be closed more quickly than when institutional lenders are involved; (2)
when institutional financing is scarce, contract for deed financing is always available; and
(3) financing terms may provide greater flexibility than institutional financing.
There are a number of advantages to persons choosing to sell their property by contract for deed. These advantages include: (1) the property need not meet Federal Housing Administration (FHA) or Veterans Administration (VA) qualifications; (2) a relatively
quick remedy exists if the vendee defaults; (3) buyers are available because of the financing flexibility; (4) an opportunity exists to earn interest on the entire balance, which is
secured by a known asset, rather than to seek a return by reinvesting after-tax sale proceeds; (5) an opportunity exists to spread payments and gains for tax purposes; and (6) a
possibility of windfall, if the vendee defaults and the property is retaken by termination of
the contract.
The advantages to persons acquiring property by contract for deed are also numerous. Vendees can obtain flexible financing terms and are virtually assured of financing,
since they do not have to qualify for institutional financing. Furthermore, vendees may be
able to assume low-interest rate mortgages along with the contract.
Today, other factors exist to increase the popularity of contracts for deed in the residential setting. Sellers may now charge higher interest rates without risking violation of
usury laws. Minnesota Statutes section 559.21 contains a grace period allowing defaulting
vendees a period in which to cure. There also appears to be a tremendous availability of
purchasers for the vendors' contract interests at discount prices. Finally, the availability of
institutional financing is drying up. Mortgage interest rates are seldom fixed, varying
with numerous economic indicators.
For a general discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of contracts for deed,
see R. KRATOVIL & R. WERNER, REAL ESTATE LAW 368-78 (8th ed. 1983); Hall & Bruess,
Real Property and Security Financtig, in MINNESOTA REAL ESTATE 175, 220-26 (Minn. Continuing Legal Education 1973).
13. For purposes of this Article, reference to a mortgage also contemplates deed of
trust arrangements which are similar to mortgages and are used more frequently in other
jurisdictions.
14. Comment, The Uniform Land Transactions Act. Time to Reform Washington's Default
Procedures For Secured Sale of Land, 17 GONZ. L. REV. 119, 122 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Comment, Tine to Reform]. The author succinctly describes the contract for deed:
The installment land contract and mortgage serve an identical purpose - the
financing of the unpaid purchase price by the seller. Under the contract, the
purchaser takes possession, making monthly payments of principal and interest
until the contract price is paid. The vendor retains legal title to the property as
security for payment of the debt until the vendee pays in full. When the vendee
has completed performance of all payments and obligations according to the
contract, the vendor conveys legal title to the vendee.
Id (footnotes omitted); see also Hume,Real Estate Contractsand the Doctrine of Equitable Conversion in Washington." Dispelling the Ashford Cloud, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 233 (1984)
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These parties are equivalent to the mortgagee and mortgagor in a
mortgage arrangement. Although the contract for deed is a security device analogous to the mortgage, it is not treated as a mortgage;' 5 rather, it is viewed as a contract and the parties are limited
6
to contractual remedies.'
Contracts for deed generally contain a provision specifying that
"time is of the essence.' 7 Traditionally, this provision has been
(comparing the contract for deed and mortgage). For a general discussion of contracts for
deed, see Clark, Installment Land Contractsin South Dakota-Part1, 6 S.D.L. REV. 248 (1961);
Corbin, The Right of a Defaulting Vendee to the Restitution of Installments Paid, 40 YALE L.J.
1013 (1931); Lee, Remedies for Breach of the Installment Land Contract, 19 U. MIAMI L. REV.
550 (1965); Ming, Contract For Deed-A Practical Prohibition, 54 OKLA. B.J. 3001 (1983);
Nelson & Whitman, The Installment Land Contract-A National Viewpoint, 1977 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 541; Power, Land Contracts as Security Devices, 12 WAYNE L. REv. 391 (1966); Vanneman, Strit Foreclosure on Land Contracts, 14 MINN. L. REV. 342 (1930); Warren, California
Installment Land Sales Contracts-A Time For Reform, 9 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 608 (1962); Comment,Forfeiture. TheAnomaly of the Land Sale Contract, 41 ALB. L. REV. 71 (1977); Comment,
The Installment Land Contract in Idaho. A Game of Chance, 15 IDAHO L. REV. 89 (1978); Comment, Installment Contractsfor the Sale of Land in Missoun, 24 Mo. L. REV. 240 (1959); Note,
Forfeiture and the Iowa Installment Land Contract, 46 IowA L. REV. 786 (1961); Note, Toward
Abolishing Installment Land Sale Contracts, 36 MONT. L. REV. 110 (1975). Cf C.F. ROLAND,
J. HYMES & L. SCHICKLI, INSTALLMENT RELATIONSHIPS (1984).
15. Although the rule that a contract for deed is not a mortgage has remained
steadfast for many years, it has recently begun to crumble. See, e.g., Skendzel v. Marshall,
261 Ind. 226, 301 N.E.2d 641 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 921 (1974) (court ordered yendee's interest to be foreclosed under mortgage statute because his equity in the property
was approximately 66% of the contract price); Sebastian v. Floyd, 585 S.W.2d 381 (Ky.
1979) (court held no distinction between contract for deed and purchase money mortgage); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § I1A (West Supp. 1983-1984) (treating mortgages and
contracts for deed similarily).
The Uniform Land Transactions Act (ULTA) specifically provides that under its
provisions a contract for deed is treated just as a mortgage. See UNIF. LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT § 3-102(a), 13 U.L.A. 654 (1980). Under the ULTA, "the traditional distinctions among security interests based largely on form or whether the creditor had 'title' to
the real estate collateral are not retained." Id., Introductory Comment to Article 3, 13
U.L.A. 652-53. For a general discussion of the ULTA and the concept of treating the
contract for deed and the mortgage as one and the same, see Bruce, Mortgage Law Reform
Under the Uniform Land TransactionsAct, 64 GEO. L.J. 1245 (1976); Pedowitz, Mortgage Foreclosure Under the Uniform Land Transactions Act (As Amended), 6 REAL. EST. L.J. 179 (1979);
Trevaskis, Summay of the Unfrm Land TransactionsAct, 13 REAL. PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 672
(1978); Comment, The Uniform Simpltfcation of Land TransfersAct.: Areas of Departurefrom State
Law, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 359 (1978); Comment, ULTA and Mon-JudicialMortgage Foreclosure
in Texas, 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1104 (1981); Comment, Secured Transactions Under Article 3 of
the Uniform Land TransactionsAct, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 899.
16. A vendor's contractual remedies include bringing an action for damages for
breach of contract. See Home Counsellors v. Folta, 246 Minn. 481, 75 N.W.2d 417 (1956);
Kirk v. Welch, 212 Minn. 300, 3 N.W.2d 426 (1942); Wilson v. Hoy, 120 Minn. 451, 139
N.W. 817 (1913).
17. See Cane, Equity andForfeitures in Contractsfor the Sale of Land, 4 U. HAWAII L. REV.
61, 61 (1982); Lee, supra note 14, at 561; Comment, Tme to Reform, supra note 14, at 123. It
is well-settled in Minnesota that the contract must expressly provide that "time is of the
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the most important difference between a contract for deed and a
mortgage, because it implies that no grace period for reinstatement, or period of redemption, is contemplated. Therefore, upon
the vendee's default, the vendor historically has been able to terminate the contract, retain the land and installments already paid,
and sue for the amount due."'
The harsh effects of contract for deed termination on defaulting
vendees have been ameliorated by judicial decisions' 9 and abrogated by statute. 20 Minnesota Statutes section 559.21 grants contract for deed vendees a right of redemption or grace period in
which to reinstate the contract. 2 ' The statute distinguishes between contracts by the date of their execution: (1) the period
before August 1, 1976;22 (2) the period between August 1, 1976
24
and May 1, 1980;23 and (3) the period from May 1, 1980 to date.

Contracts executed during any one of these periods may be terminated by the vendor upon the vendee's default. The vendor
must serve notice 25 on the defaulting vendee, specifying the conditions of default and stipulating the statutory terms which establish
the length of reinstatement. 26 In certain instances, the vendor may
27
obtain attorneys' fees.

The three time periods are significant because they control the
length of the reinstatement period. Vendees of contracts that were
executed in the period before August 1976 have a thirty-day reinessence" since it will not otherwise be implied. See Porten v. Peterson, 139 Minn. 152, 166
N.W. 183 (1918); Austin v. Wacks, 30 Minn. 335, 15 N.W. 409 (1883); Gill v. Bradley, 21
Minn. 15 (1874).
18. See Lee, supra note 14, at 123.
19. From the maxim "equity abhors a forfeiture," courts have prevented cancellation
of contracts for deed and ordered specific performance on equitable grounds. See Cane,
supra note 17, at 63. This action is the doctrine of equitable conversion, under which a
vendee is entitled to specific performance of the contract. See Johnson v. Quaal, 250
Minn. 154, 83 N.W.2d 796 (1957); Reynolds v. Franklin, 41 Minn. 279, 43 N.W. 53
(1889). Courts will not, however, compel specific performance by a seller where such a
result would be inequitable. See Hilton v. Nelsen, 283 N.W.2d 877 (Minn. 1979).
20. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 559.21 (1982 & Supp. 1983). See generall Note, Cancellation
of Contracsfor Deed- The Constitutionality of the Minnesota Statutog Procedure, 58 MINN. L. REV.
247 (1973).
21. MINN. STAT. § 559.21 (1982 & Supp. 1983).
22. See id.§ 559.21, subd. la.
23. See id § 559.21, subd. 1.
24. See id § 559.21, subd. 2.
25. See, e.g., id.§ 559.21, subd. 3.
26. The applicable factors are set forth in subdivisions 1, la, and 2. See id § 559.21,
subds. 1, la, 2.
27. See id
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statement period.28 For contracts executed between August 1976
and May 1980, the length of the reinstatement period varies according to the percentage of the purchase price paid, exclusive of
interest thereon and any mortgages or prior contracts for deed
which have been assumed by the vendee.2 9 The breakdown is as
follows:
Percent Paid
Length of Reinstatement
0-30%
30 days
30-50%
45 days
60 days3 0
50% or more
The length of reinstatement for contracts executed after May 1,
1980 is also determined by the percentage of the purchase price
paid. 3 1 The relationship is as follows:
Percent Paid
Length of Reinstatement
0-10%
10-25%

30 days
60 days

90 days3 2

25% or more

The various periods of reinstatement for a contract for deed described in Minnesota Statutes section 559.21 are relatively short
compared to the six or twelve-month periods available to redeeming mortgagors.3 3 Nevertheless, the contract for deed reinstatement periods represent a significant departure from the harsh
consequences suffered by defaulting vendees before the enactment
of section 559.21.
B.

Mortgage Foreclosure

There are two methods of mortgage foreclosure available in
Minnesota: 34 foreclosure by action 35 and foreclosure by advertise28. Id. § 559.21, subd. Ia.
29. Id § 559.21, subd. 1.
30. Id
31. Id § 559.21, subd. 2.
32. Id
33. See id § 580.23.
34. A third method of foreclosure, strict foreclosure, is virtually unavailable in Minnesota. See id § 581.12. Strict foreclosure allows the mortgagee to obtain the property
without having to acquire it at a sheriff's sale. Strict foreclosure is available in other
states, including Connecticut and Vermont. See R. KRATOVIL & R. WERNER, MODERN
MORTGAGE LAW AND PRACTICE § 41.11, AT 625 (2D ED. 198 1); see also Note, The Relation of
the Equitable Doctrine of Subrogation to Vermont's Strict Foreclosure Laws, 7 Vt. L. Rev. 71 (1982).
For the tax consequences of mortgage foreclosure, see Wetstone, Involuntary Difpositonms of
Real Estate in a Recessionary Economy - Mininizing Tax Impact of Repossessions, Foreclosures and
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ment. 36 The determining factor in the mortgagee's ability to select
one procedure over the other is whether the mortgage contains a
power of sale clause.37 Absent a power of sale clause in the mortgage, the mortgagee must foreclose by action: commencing a civil
action against the mortgagor, seeking a judgment for the amount
due on the mortgage, and obtaining an order directing the sale of
the real estate. 38 Although this process is cumbersome and timeconsuming, the mortgagee is entitled to maintain an action for a
deficiency judgment if the proceeds from the sale do not satisfy the
amount secured by the mortgage. 39 After the property is sold, the
mortgagor is granted a statutory period of redemption. 40
Foreclosure by advertisement is available to mortgagees when
the mortgage contains a power of sale clause. 4 1 This extrajudicial
process is less time-consuming than foreclosure by action, taking
approximately eight to ten weeks to complete. 42 Rather than commencing a civil action, the mortgagee initiates foreclosure proceedings by publishing notice of a sheriff's sale for six weeks43 in a legal
newspaper within the county where the property is situated and
by serving a copy of the notice upon the person in possession of the
mortgaged premises. 44 Unless the mortgagor tenders payment of
the amount actually due on the mortgage, including insurance,
delinquent taxes, interest, cost of publication and service of proDefaults Bankruptcy Tax Act; Restructurng and Recasting of Real Estate Transactions,Moratoriums,
Refinancing, 41 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 24-1, 24-16 to -25 (1983).
Federal law may affect the foreclosure process if one of the federal programs is involved. Loans may be backed by one of a number of the federal agencies, including the
FHA, Farmer's Home Administration (FmHA), Small Business Administration (SBA), or
VA. Discussion of federal law and its effect on mortgage foreclosure in Minnesota, however, is beyond the scope of this Article. For an excellent guide to foreclosing mortgages in
Minnesota, see BURKE & BURTON ON MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES: A STEP BY STEP
GUIDE FOR LENDERS AND ATTORNEYS (Win. Mitchell Forums 1981).
35. See MINN. STAT. §§ 581.01-.12 (1982).
36. See id. §§ 580.01-.30 (1982 & Supp. 1983).
37. See id § 580.01.
38. The procedure for conducting a sheriff's sale is set out in Minnesota Statutes section 580.06. See id. § 580.06.
39. See id. § 580.23. See generally Nelson, Def iencyJudgments After Real Estate Foreclosures
in Missouri.- Some Modest Proposals, 47 Mo. L. REV. 151 (1982) (survey of law governing
deficiency judgments).
40. See MINN. STAT. § 580.23 (1982).
41. See id. § 580.01. The mortgage must also be recorded to foreclose by advertisement. See id. § 580.02.
42. See Knapp, supra note 7, at 192.
43. MINN. STAT. § 580.03 (1982).
44. See id.
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cess, and attorneys' fees before the foreclosure sale, 45 the property
may be sold by the sheriff at a public sale. 46 After the sale, the
mortgagor has either six 4 7 or twelve 48 months to redeem the property, depending on whether one of three statutory conditions is
met. 49 The mortgagee is entitled to seek a deficiency judgment
only if the mortgaged property qualifies for a twelve-month re50
demption period.
C

Redemptoiy Periods

Redemption provides the mortgagor with an opportunity to
preserve his equity in the property. Two distinct periods of redemption are available to defaulting mortgagors in Minnesota:
equitable and statutory. 5 1
Equitable redemption is the period between the mortgagor's
failure to make a payment, or other default, and the foreclosure
sale. In foreclosure by action, the equitable period of redemption
is the actual time necessary for the mortgagee to obtain a judgment and an order, and have the property sold. 52 In foreclosure
by advertisement, the equitable period of redemption is the time
53
required by statute to publish notice and consummate the sale.
Thus, in Minnesota the period of equitable redemption can vary
from two months to over one year. Under either procedure, the
defaulting mortgagor may cure his default by paying the amount
54
in arrears before the sheriff sells the property.
45. See id § 580.30.
46. See id § 580.06.
47. See id. § 580.23, subd. 1.
48. See id. § 580.23, subd. 2.
49. See id.; see also tnfa notes 194-99 and accompanying text (discussing three statutory conditions affecting length of statutory redemptory periods).
50. MINN. STAT. § 580.23, subd. 2 (1982).
51. For a concise discussion of these two periods of redemption, see Comment, Statutoy Redemption Following Power of Sale Foreclosure in AMissourt, 47 Mo. L. REv. 309, 310-14
(1982).
52. See MINN. STAT. § 581.03 (1982).
53. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
54. See MINN. STAT. § 580.30 (1982). This section permits the mortgagor to reinstate
the mortgage at any time before the property is sold by paying:
to the holder of the mortgage so being foreclosed, or to the attorney foreclosing
the same, or to the sheriff of the county, the amount actually due thereon and
constituting the default actually existing in the conditions of the mortgage at the
time of the commencement of the foreclosure proceedings, including insurance,
delinquent taxes, if any, upon the premises, interest to date of payment, cost of
publication and services of process or notices, attorney's fees not exceeding $150
or one half of the attorney's fees authorized by section 582.01, whichever is
greater, together with other lawful disbursements necessarily incurred in connec-
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Following the foreclosure sale, statutory redemption provides
the defaulting mortgagor with a second opportunity to redeem the
55
property. This period is the same for both foreclosure by action
and

foreclosure
58

by

advertisement: 56

either

six

57

or

twelve

months.
Minnesota's procedures on mortgage foreclosure and contract
for deed termination reflect the state's strong historical concern
over protecting farm and home ownership. These procedures, particularly those establishing the redemptory periods, were carefully
created by the legislature. Similarly, the legislature carefully considered the state's desire to preserve home ownership when it
passed the Act. In doing so, the legislature avoided "[t]he grave
danger [that] lies in the hasty adoption of proposals which are not
'59
bottomed on the experience of the past."
III.

A HISTORY OF MORATORIA LEGISLATION

The basis of the Act, a moratorium, is rooted in earlier legislative endeavors in the area of mortgage foreclosure and, more
broadly, the efforts of others throughout the course of ancient and
modern American history. Generally, moratoria legislation has
been used to protect the economic structures of nations and to provide equitable relief to the populace. A moratorium essentially is
the postponement of obligations decreed by the sovereign through
the judiciary or the legislature. 6°
A.

Ancient Moratoria

The concept of moratoria legislation originated in antiquity.
tion with the proceedings by the party foreclosing, then, and in that event, the
mortgage shall be fully reinstated and further proceedings in such foreclosure
shall be thereupon abandoned.
Id
55. See id § 581.10.
56. See id § 580.23.
57. Id § 580.23, subd. 1.
58. Id § 580.23, subd. 2.
59. See Feller, Moratoy Legt'ahon: A Comparatze Study, 46 HARV. L. REv. 1061, 1065
(1933).
60. See id at 1061. Special moratoria applying to individual debtors, or classes of
debtors, and general moratoria affecting the entire populace are the two primary types of
moratoria. Special moratoria have been soundly criticized as usually "more productive of
evil than good," and as "the sources of corruption and uncertainty." Id General moratoria, on the other hand, have been endorsed as "a vital necessity in critical periods." Id
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Plutarch'sLives 6 ' provides an example of a moratorium from the
Greek experience. Solon reduced the principal and interest on
debts by a "Seisachthea," a decree that operated analogously to a
moratorium. 62 Demosthenes also mentioned the use of a moratorium in one of his speeches. In reference to a suit for the misappropriation of property owned by a warrior who had been serving in
the military, Demosthenes stated: "I could not commence a private action as there were no actions at that time, all such business
'63
being postponed on account of the war."
The first general moratorium was perhaps that decreed by Justinian in 555 A.D., in response to the Frank's invasion of Italy and
64
Sicily.

After the invasion, the Justinian Code was construed to

permit a sovereign to issue orders staying court actions involving
individual debtors. 65 The authority of the courts was extended to
stay proceedings for entire classes of debtors. 66 The practice of affording equitable relief, however, was disparaged by the debtor's
ability to purchase a grant of respite from the sovereign. 67
A number of continental codes followed the Justinian example
and authorized the courts to grant moratoria during times of
war.68 Moratoria, however, have not been limited solely to periods
of armed conflict. Emergency legislation in the form of moratoria,
authorizing the extension of time in which a debtor may satisfy his
obligations, has also been enacted over the course of history in response to various national calamities such as floods, civil unrest,
and events disrupting the economy. 69
B.

The American Experience with Moratoria Legislation

Emergencies giving rise to popular demands for debtor relief
have created a consistent theme in American history. From the
61. SOLON, I PLUTARCH'S LIVES 182 (Clough ed. 1899), quoted in Feller,supra note 59,
at 1062 n.3.
62. See Feller, supra note 59, at 1062 n.2.
63. 5 DEMOSTHENES ORATIONS, AGAINST STEPHANUS I 46 (Kennedy ed. 1881),
quoted bn Feller, supra note 59, at 1062 n.3.
64. Feller, supra note 59, at 1062.
65. Id
66. Id For example, the Justinian Code allowed French kings to provide equitable
relief to the Crusaders and to persons indebted to Jews. Id Moratoria were similarly used
in England during the Tudor period, where the English Privy Council maintained the
power to stay proceedings brought against individual debtors. See id at 1063.
67. See id at 1062-63.
68. See id.at 1064.
69. See Lorenzen, Moratoiy Legislation Relating to Bills and Notes and the Confi/t of Laws,
28 YALE L.J. 324, 325 (1919).
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early days of the Republic, colonial legislatures passed various stay
laws, legal tender laws, laws of valuation, and other laws providing
relief to debtors. 70 These enactments had a disastrous effect upon
public and private credit. 7 1 The problem was compounded by the
Republic's battles with England during the American Revolution
which drew heavily on the public treasury. Although the Continental Congress attempted to ameliorate the credit problem in
1775,72 state legislatures refused to cooperate with the national
scheme. 73 As a result, inflation beseiged the American economy
and a general economic chaos, which represented a profound peril
74
to creditors, ensued.
Concerns over the economic chaos, resulting primarily from
state interference, provided the basis for the adoption of the contract clause of the Constitution: "No State shall coin Money; emit
Bills of Credit; make any thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender
in Payment of Debts; [or] pass any. . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts. . . . -75 One of the earliest successful attacks on
70. See 1 G.

BANCROFT, HISTORY OF THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF

228-41 (1903).
71. Problems in the availability of credit were also a result of the difficulty political
leaders had in providing an expanding American economy with an adequate supply of
currency. Gold and silver coin was lost because of the unequal trade balance between the
Republic and England. See S. RATNER, J. SOLTOW & R. SYLLA, THE EVOLUTION OF THE
AMERICAN ECONOMY: GROWTH, WELFARE, AND DECISION MAKING 71 (1979).
72. The Continental Congress issued bills of credit that passed for currency to meet
the expenses of the revolution. See id at 86.
73. Instead of levying taxes to satisfy the demands of the Continental Congress, the
states further complicated the national scheme by printing their own paper money. Id.
74. Inflation resulted in a sharp decline in the specie value of the original continental
paper money. See id
75. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. Chief Justice Marshall reflected on this period in
history:
The power of changing the relative situation of debtor and creditor, of interfering with contracts, a power which comes home to every man, touches the interest
of all, and controls the conduct of every individual in those which things he
supposes to be proper for his own exclusive management, had been used to such
an excess by the state legislatures, as to break in upon the ordinary intercourse of
society, and destroy all confidence between man and man. The mischief had
become so great, so alarming, as not only to impair commercial intercourse, and
threaten the existence of credit, but to sap the morals of the people, and destroy
the sanctity of private faith. To guard against the continuance of the evil was an
object of deep interest with all the truly wise, as well as the virtuous, of this great
community, and was one of the important benefits expected from a reform of the
government.
Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 354-55 (1827). As one commentator suggested, one of the principal objectives in calling the 1787 Constitutional Convention was
to restrict excesses in state government and compel conformity to further national unity.
See Hynning, Constitutionalityof Moratoov Legislation, 12 CHi.-KI NT L. REV. 182, 188 (1934).
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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a statute premised upon the contract clause occurred in Champion v.
Casey. 76 The Circuit Court for the District of Rhode Island construed the validity of a Rhode Island statutory scheme which
granted debtors the right to petition for a three-year extension to
settle accounts with creditors.7 7 According to Supreme Court historian Charles Warren, a newspaper account of Champion noted:
"'The defendant's counsel pleaded a resolution of the State in bar
of the action, by which he was allowed three years to pay his debts
and during which he was to be free from arrests on that account.' "78 The Champion court held that the individual states are
prohibited by the United States Constitution from making laws
79
which impair contractual obligations.
Popular demand created pressure for various moratoria in response to emergency situations. Although many state courts resisted the pressures of these events, state legislatures frequently
yielded to the public will, enacting moratoria legislation notwithstanding the invalidity of the Rhode Island scheme. In construing
these moratoria, courts developed a two-prong analysis, focusing
on the effect of the moratorium on the rights of the parties to the
impaired contract and the impetus for the legislation.
In applying the first prong of the analysis, courts developed an
artificial distinction between moratoria that changed the obligations of the parties to the contract and moratoria that altered the
remedy for breach of contract. In Sturges v. Crownshield,80 Chief
Justice Marshall stated:
The distinction between the obligation of a contract, and the
remedy given by the legislature to enforce that obligation, has
been taken at the bar, and exists in the nature of things. Without impairing the obligation of the contract, the remedy may
certainly be modified as the wisdom of the nation shall direct. 8 '
Thus, if the moratorium was construed to impinge upon the remedy only, it was constitutionally permissible.8 2 If, however, the ex76. Champion was an unreported decision. See Hynning, supra note 75, at 191. The
Rhode Island moratorium also allowed creditors to avoid arrest and exempted their property from attachment. See 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HisTORY 67 (rev. ed. 1926).
77. See 1 C. WARREN, supra note 76, at 67.
78. Id
79. See id
80. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
81. Id at 200.
82. In Bronsen v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311 (1843), Chief Justice Taney opined:
[U]ndoubtedly, a state may regulate at pleasure the modes of proceeding in its
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press terms of the contract were affected by the moratorium, then
the legislation was held violative of the contract clause.
In the second prong of the analysis, courts focused on the impetus of the legislation. The existence of an emergency satisfied this
prong and legitimized moratoria legislation. The Louisiana
Supreme Court, upholding a moratorium imposed after an invasion of Louisiana by British troops in 1814, commented:
[We] presume that in any time obnoxious to the due administration of justice, it is the duty, and within the power of the
legislature, to pass laws to avert or diminish the consequences
of the general calamity; and a law called for by such circumstances, and fairly intended to meet the exigency of the day,
could not be properly classed among those which impair the
obligations of contracts, though one of 8its3 consequences would
be some delay in the recovery of debts.
Thus, the principle emerged that, in circumstances where the public welfare, health, or safety is involved, constitutional rights protecting private contracts must yield to the greater public need.
This principle is expressed in the police power of the states.
The exercise of a state's police power, however, is constrained by
the limitation of reasonableness. The Rent Cases8 4 demonstrated
the breadth of the police power available to legislatures. During
World War I, hundreds of thousands of people moved into New
York and Washington, D.C. The influx placed a great strain on
available housing. Landlords took undue advantage of these people as the situation worsened, demanding exorbitant rents and
summarily evicting tenants who failed to pay. The housing situation deteriorated to the point where public health and safety were
jeopardized. In response to this emergency, corrective legislation
courts in relation to past contracts as well as future.

. . . Although a new rem-

edy may be deemed less convenient than the old one, and may in some degree
render the recovery of debts more tardy and difficult, yet it will not follow that

the law is unconstitutional. Whatever belongs merely to the remedy may be
altered according to the will of the state, provided the alteration does not impair
the obligation of the contract.
Id at 315-16. Thus, a moratorium could validly impair a contractual remedy, but only to
the extent that the obligations provided within the contract remained unimpaired.

83. Johnson v. Duncan, 3 Mart. 530, 545 (La. 1815). The Louisiana legislation provided that "fn]o civil suit or action shall be commenced, or prosecuted, before any court of
record, or any tribunal of the state, till the first of May next." Id at 546.
84. See Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242 (1922); Marcus Brown Holding Co.
v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921); Guttag v. Shatzkin,
230 N.Y. 647, 130 N.E. 929 (1921); People ex el. Durham Realty Corp. v. La Fetra, 230
N.Y. 429, 130 N.E. 601, appealdenied, 257 U.S. 665 (1921).
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8
was enacted.

5

The New York corrective legislation limited rentals to "reasonable" amounts and gave the courts authority to determine whether
the rent charged was reasonable. 6 The legislation had only a prospective effect, allowing lease arrangements entered into before its
enactment to remain unimpaired.8 7 As leases expired, the legislation provided that landlords could not evict tenants who were willing to pay reasonable rents.88
Notwithstanding the prospective application of the New York
legislation, a landlord's right to complete, unfettered contractual
freedom was diminished. When brought under judicial scrutiny,
the legislation was sustained by the New York Court of Appeals in
People ex rel Durham Realty Corp. v. La Fetra.89 The court held that

the state was justified in exercising its police power as a legitimate
response to an emergency threatening the public welfare. 9° In
Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman,9 1 the United States Supreme

Court also addressed the validity of the New York legislation, sustaining it as a valid exercise of the state's police power for the protection of the public interest.9 2 In reconciling the New York
legislation with the constraints of the contract clause, the Court
stated: "Contracts are made subject to this exercise of power of
the state when otherwise justified. '9 3 The Court's decision was
premised on the existence of an emergency that threatened the
public welfare. As Justice Holmes noted in a later decision, sustaining moratoria legislation enacted in response to an emergency
"went to the verge of the law."'9 4
C

Minnesota's First Experience with a Mortgage
ForeclosureMoratorium

By 1933, the mortgage debts in Minnesota posed a grave prob85. For a general discussion of New York's rent control laws, see Willis, A Short tHzstofy
of Rent Control Laws, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 54 (1950).
86. See La Fetra, 230 N.Y. at 438-39, 130 N.E. at 604 (Pound, J.).
87. See id. at 440, 130 N.E. at 604.
88. See id. at 439, 130 N.E. at 604.

89. 230 N.Y. 429, 130 N.E. 601, appeal denied, 257 U.S. 665 (1921).
90. See id. at 436, 130 N.E. at 609.

91.

256 U.S. 170 (1921).

92. See id at 198.

93.
94.
Court's
ington,

Id
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922) (referring to the
earlier decision in Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921), which sustained a WashD.C. rent control law similar to the New York legislation).
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lem. Over half of the farm land in Minnesota was mortgaged. 95
As William Prosser noted:
The increase in the value of the dollar, together with the almost
complete collapse of farm prices, which had fallen below the
cost of production, made it inevitable that these mortgages
should be in default when payment fell due. The result was a
constantly mounting wave of foreclosures and forced sales,
which flooded the market and drove land values abruptly
down, until in many counties land virtually could not be sold.
This in turn caused an entire absence of competitive bidding at
foreclosure sales, so that in most cases the mortgage holder was
in a position to bid in the property at a nominal figure, and
recover a deficiency judgment against the mortgagor for an
96
amount almost equal to the unpaid debt.
As a result of this crisis, foreclosed mortgagors were reduced to
economic serfs.
In acknowledgement of the increasing public demand for an
end to the malaise, remedial action was taken. One attempt involved the concept of "penny sales." When a farmer was foreclosed, neighboring farmers packed the sheriff's sale, purchased the
assets for a penny, and resold the personal property to the foreclosed mortgagor. The courts created their own remedial devicethe "upset price."' 97 An upset price was a court-imposed minimum
price for which the foreclosed property could be sold at a sheriff's
98
sale.
These homegrown remedies, however, failed to ameliorate the
crisis and to allay the growing concerns of the public. Instances of
mob activities and concerted protests were widespread.9 9 When
the Minnesota Legislature was about to convene in 1933, Governor Floyd B. Olson'0° was under significant pressure from state
95. See Prosser, The Minnesota Mortgage Moraton'um, 7 S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 353-54
(1934); see also Breimyer, Agricultural Philosophiesand Policies in the New Deal, 68 MINN. L.
REV. 333, 334 (1983) (crisis on the farms stirred national debate for farm relief). Prosser

noted that "[a] survey of farm mortgages in Minnesota... indicated that, in 1930, 53.8%
of the owner-operated farms in Minnesota were mortgaged." Prosser, supra, at 354 n. 10.
96. Prosser, supra note 95, at 354-55 (footnotes omitted).
97. See Nelson, supra note 39, at 154.
98. See Brinckley v. Sager, 232 Wis. 88, 286 N.W. 570 (1939).
99. See Prosser, supra note 95, at 355 n.18.
100. Governor Olson, described by a biographer as "more a rebel than a radical," was
a natural to take up the cause of the disadvantaged. See G. MAYER, THE POLITICAL
CAREER OF FLOYD B. OLSON 3 (1951). Olson was reared in a North Minneapolis slum
where he acquired a life-long sympathy for the poor. See id at 7. His concern for the
economically disadvantaged was evidenced by earlier efforts with major Depression re-
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leaders and the general public to address the crisis of farmers facing mortgage foreclosure.101

In response to the public clamor for relief, Governor Olson issued an executive order prohibiting county sheriffs from proceed0 2
ing with foreclosure sales until the legislature adjourned.1
Accompanying the Governor's order was the following message:
[The order is] not based upon a moratorium but it is based
upon the necessity for preserving order within the boundaries of
forms including a graduated state income tax and a ban on "yellow dog" contracts. See id
at 122-23.
101. See Prosser, supra note 95, at 355. Prosser described the scene facing Governor
Olson as the legislative session commenced: "When the legislature assembled, a caravan
of two or three thousand farmers descended upon St. Paul from southern Minnesota, in an
astonishing array of antedeluvian automobiles, and swarmed over the capitol, making
demands and threats and uttering dire predictions." Id. (footnotes omitted).
102. See id. The executive order provided:
'Whereas, many persons are at present unable to pay interest or principal
payments due upon mortgages given by them upon their homes, particularly
persons engaged in agricultural pursuits, because of an economic depression, the
causes of which, and the remedies for which, are beyond their control, and
'Whereas, as a consequence thereof mortgage foreclosure proceedings are
being had throughout the state of Minnesota upon the homes of such persons,
and
'Whereas, many persons are unable for the same reason to pay interest or
principal payments due upon notes secured by chattel mortgages upon furniture
and upon livestock, agricultural produce and farm machinery, and
'Whereas, many of such persons and many other persons sympathetic to the
plight of such persons about to lose their homes and personal property through
such foreclosure proceeedings, have undertaken by force to restrain such foreclosure proceedings, and
'Whereas, such attempted restraint is the act of persons otherwise obedient
to law and order, and otherwise desirous of upholding the constitution and laws
of the United States and of the State of Minnesota, and
'Whereas, under the constitution of Minnesota, it is the duty of the governor
to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed,' and,
'Whereas, it would be unwise and unjust in this present emergency to use
the armed forces of the state of Minnesota to compel such foreclosure proceedings as may be instituted or are now instituted against such properties, and
'Whereas, the legislature of the state of Minnesota is now assembled and has
the power and authority by adequate legislation to prevent injustice in such foreclosures by altering the procedure now prescribed for foreclosures:
'Now, therefore, it is hereby ordered that each and every sheriff and each
and every constable and police officer of the state of Minnesota refrain and desist
until May 1, 1933, or until further order from foreclosing or attempting to foreclose any mortgage upon any of the following properties situated in the state of
Minnesota, to-wit:
'Real estate upon which the mortgagor has his residence, furniture and
household goods used by a householder mortgagor.
'Farm machinery and livestock in use and possessed by a mortgagor actively
engaged in farming.
'Agricultural produce in the hands of the producer thereof.'
Suspension Runs to May I or "Until FurtherOrder" Homes and FarmsInvolved, St. Paul Dispatch,
Feb. 24, 1933, at 1-2 [hereinafter cited as Suspension].
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this state. 'I have refrained heretofore, from making such an
order because I did not believe that I had the legal authority
in the State. Such
therefore until an acute situation developed
10 3
an acute situation has now developed.'
0 4
Although the executive order was later held unconstitutional,1 it
tempered public concern and stimulated legislative action.
With Governor Olson's executive order in place, the Minnesota
Legislature convened and deliberated over various solutions to the
0 6
05
After considerable compromise,
mortgage foreclosure crisis.'
the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Act' 0 7 (1933 Legislation)
was passed on the last day of the legislative session.
The 1933 Legislation was premised on a legislative declaration
of an economic emergency.' 0 8 The legislation contained several
principal provisions allowing mortgagors to seek a stay of the foreclosure proceedings by applying to the district court. 0 9 The 1933
Legislation authorized courts to overturn sheriffs' sales where the
103. Suspension, supra note 102, at 1. The legislature hastily enacted a measure sustaining Governor Olson's order in the early days of the legislative session. The measure
validated the acts of county sheriffs in postponing foreclosure sales. See Act of Mar. 2,
1933, ch. 44, 1933 Minn. Laws 46. Governor Olson seized the legislative initiative and
sent the following telegram to county sheriffs:
House File 1279 passed by Minnesota Legislature and signed by me today authorizes you to postpone any sale upon the foreclosure of any real estate mortgage by action or advertisement for a period of ninety days or to any date
subsequent to April thirtieth, nineteen thirty three without incurring any liability whatsoever upon your part stop Compliance with my proclamation of February twenty four, nineteen thirty three ordering you to cease and desist from the
foreclosure of certain mortgages specified in my order necessarily follows stop
With the assistance of your county attorney as requested by the Attorney General of Minnesota today you will prepare a notice of postponement in the case of
each mortgage you have already postponed and in the case of each mortgage
foreclosure the sale of which is set for a date prior to May first stop You will
prepare a typewritten notice thereof sign it and post it at one of the entrance
doors of the court house of your county stop This law also validates all postponements previously made by you without the necessity of any publication in any
legal newspaper and without the necessity of any notice except the one hereinbefore referred to stop I greatly appreciate your past compliance with my Order
and am sure of having your cooperation in the future, particularly in view of the
fact that I have removed any possibility of legal liability on your part by reason
of such compliance.
Telegram from Governor Floyd B. Olson to Minnesota County Sheriffs (Mar. 2, 1933) (on
file in the William Mitchell Law Review Office).
104. See State ex rel Lichtscheidl v. Moeller, 189 Minn. 412, 249 N.W. 330 (1933).
105. For a short summary of the various proposals brought before the legislature, see
Prosser, supra note 95, at 356.
106. See id at 360 n.55.
107. See Act of Apr. 18, 1933, ch. 339, 1933 Minn. Laws 514; see also Act of Apr. 22,
1933, ch. 422, 1933 Minn. Laws 798 (moratorium on contracts for deed).
108. See Act of Apr. 18, 1933, ch. 339, pt. I, § 1, 1933 Minn. Laws 514, 516.
109. See id § 2, 1933 Minn. Laws at 516.
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amount received for the property was inadequate 1° and to extend
either the equitable or statutory periods of redemption."' The
legislation also contained a provision prohibiting mortgagees from
maintaining actions for deficiency judgments until the expiration
12
of the statutory period of redemption.
The constitutionality of the 1933 Legislation was promptly
tested in Home Buildzng & Loan Association v. Blazsdell 113 The challenge arose out of a factual context probably not envisioned by
Governor Olson or the legislature-foreclosure on a boarding
house in urban Minneapolis.' 14 Fourteen days before the period of
statutory redemption was to expire, the mortgagor petitioned the
Hennepin County District Court seeking relief under the 1933
Legislation. 1 5 The trial court upheld the 1933 Legislation and its
16
decision was affirmed by the Minnesota Supreme Court."
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court sustained the validity of the 1933 Legislation. 1' 7 In upholding the legislation
against the challenge that it violated the contract clause of the
Constitution, the Court stated:
Emergency does not create power. Emergency does not increase granted power or remove or diminish the restrictions imposed upon power granted or reserved. The Constitution was
adopted in a period of grave emergency. Its grant of power to
the Federal Government and its limitations of the power of the
States were determined in the light of emergency and they are
not altered by emergency.118
The Court's statement is significant: the Constitution, whether it
be the contract clause or any other provisions, may not be suspended by the existence of an emergency. Rather, " 'the reservation of the reasonable exercise of the protective power of the State
is read into all contracts ..

' "119

The Court's decision in Blazsdel/ rested upon five essential crite110. See id § 3, 1933 Minn. Laws at 517.
111. See id.§ 4, 1933 Minn. Laws at 517-19.
112. See id

113. 189 Minn. 422, 249 N.W. 334 (1933), afd, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
114. Blazsdell, 290 U.S. at 420. The boarding house contained fourteen rooms, three of
which the mortgagor and his family occupied. Thus, the property was the mortgagor's
homestead and properly subject to relief under the 1933 Legislation. See id
115. See id.at 419.
116. Blaisdel/, 189 Minn. 422, 249 N.W. 334.
117. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398.
118. Id. at 425.
119. Prosser, supra note 95, at 365.
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ria: (1) the existence of an emergency; (2) legislation addressed to
a legitimate societal interest; (3) appropriate relief afforded only
on reasonable conditions; (4) reasonable protection of those whose
contractual rights are impaired; and (5) legislation of limited duration. 20 Upon these criteria, Minnesota's first experience with a
mortgage foreclosure moratorium was sustained and the framework for enacting a similar moratorium fifty years later was
established.
IV.

THE SCOPE OF MINNESOTA'S MORATORIUM ON
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE

2
The scope of the Act is limited to homestead property,' 1
whether it be agricultural or residential. 22 The Act is retroactive,
covering property encumbered by first mortgages 2 3 or contracts

120. See Blazsdell, 290 U.S. at 444-47.
121. Act of May 23, 1983, ch. 215, § 6, 1983 Minn. Laws 654, 655 (codified at MINN.
STAT. § 583.03 (Supp. 1983)). The term "homestead" is defined as "residential or agricultural real estate, a portion or all of which is entitled to receive homestead credit under
section 273.13, subdivision 15a." Id. § 5, 1983 Minn. Laws at 655 (codified at MINN.
STAT. § 583.02 (Supp. 1983)). One commentator noted that owners of manufactured
homes may seek relief under the Act given the definition of "homestead." See Knapp,
supra note 7, at 194; see also Telephone interview with Mr. Joe Chrastil, Citizens Organizations Acting Together (COACT) (Dec. 22, 1983) (mobile homeowners have received relief
under the Act).
122. See Act of May 23, 1983, ch. 215, § 5, 1983 Minn. Laws 654, 655 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 583.02 (Supp. 1983)). Foreclosure of agricultural property has received
considerable attention recently. In 1981, the earnings of Minnesota farmers plunged to
their lowest levels in more than a decade. Brandt, Farm earnings rise 77pet., but are still low,
Minneapolis Star & Trib., June 14, 1983, at IB, col. 1. Farmers were also plagued by high
property taxes and decreasing land values. See Klauda, Property tax, landprce drop whzpsaws
farmers, Minneapelis Star & Trib., Mar. 25, 1984, at ID, col. 6. The FmHA, often called
the credit agency of last resort for farmers who cannot get loans elsewhere, was temporarily enjoined from foreclosing farm property through the balance of 1983. See Kendall,
FmHA ofces ordered to halt foreclosuresfor rest ofyear, Minneapolis Star & Trib., Nov. 17,
1983, at 6B, col. 1; see also Courtforbidsforeclosing of 7farm loans, Minneapolis Star & Trib.,
July 1, 1983, at 3B, col. 3. For a discussion of the current injunction prohibiting the
FmHA from foreclosing farm real estate, see infra note 157. To compound the FmHA's
troubles, even when it was not enjoined from foreclosing by a court, it was thwarted by a
local sheriff who refused to conduct a sale of farm property. See Brandt, Wiconsin sheriff
holds up FmHA on nonjudicialfarmforeclosures, Minneapolis Star & Trib., June 26, 1983, at
ID, col. 1.
123. Act of May 23, 1983, ch. 215, § 6, 1983 Minn. Laws 654, 655 (codified at MINN.
STAT. § 583.03, subd. 1 (Supp. 1983)). Proponents of the Act attempted to extend the
relief provisions to include second mortgages as well during the 1984 legislative session. See
Tape Recording of H.F 2036 Before the HouseJudicay Committee (1984) (testimony of Rep.
Elliof). Lobbyists for the banking industry opposed inclusion of second mortgages in the
Act's relief provisions, arguing that many second mortgages were given to secure funds to
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for deed 124 executed prior to its enactment.

12 5

It also covers mort-

gages and contracts for deed that have been extended or renewed
for less than one year after its enactment.12 6 Furthermore, the Act
applies to mortgages held by federal agencies. 127 The relief provided by the Act is available only once to a mortgagor or vendee
on a particular piece of property. 128 Finally, the Act has a limited
duration. 129
The Act permits mortgagors and vendees to obtain an ex parte
stay of foreclosure or termination, thus extending the period of equitable redemption. 130 It also provides for a delay in the sale of
travel and send children through college. See id (testimony of Mike George and John
Corbitt). Second mortgages, therefore, were not included in the Act. See id.
124. Act of May 23, 1983, ch. 215, § 6, 1983 Minn. Laws 654, 655 (codified at MINN.
STAT. § 583.03, subd. 2 (Supp. 1983)).
125. Id
126. Id
127. Id (codified at MINN. STAT. § 583.03, subd. 1 (Supp. 1983)). This provision is
considerably different from the Act's predecessor which specifically excluded such mortgages from relief. See Act of Apr. 18, 1933, ch. 339, preamble, 1933 Minn. Laws 514, 51415; see also Leuthold v. Des Moines Jt. Stock Land Bank, 197 Minn. 132, 266 N.W. 450
(1936); Weisman v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 196 Minn. 574, 265 N.W. 431
(1936). Inclusion of federal mortgages in the Act raises concern over the possible violation
of the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. VI. The
preemptive effects of federal regulations over state mortgage foreclosure law are beyond
the scope of this Article. For a brief analysis of the ramifications of preemption, see
Knapp, supra note 7, at 199-200.
Notwithstanding the legal concerns over preemption, the Act also has an impact on
the availability of mortgage money in Minnesota from federal agencies and an effect on
the secondary mortgage market for mortgages originated by Minnesota lenders. At hearings on the extension of the Act, Mike George, a representative of the Mortgage Lenders
Association of Minnesota, noted that two-thirds of mortgage money in Minnesota comes
from outside the state. See Tape Recording of Hearings on H.F 2036 Before the HouseJudicag
Committee (1984) (testimony of Mike George). Mr. George stated that if the legislature
continues to impair the ability of mortgagees to foreclose, federal lenders could take action
to dry up mortgage money in the state. Mr. George noted a recent example of a federal
agency response to earlier Minnesota legislative efforts prohibiting the enforceability of
due-on-sale clauses-the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation's red-lining of Minnesota at a cost of nearly $300 million in mortgage money. See id. John Corbitt, a representative of the Savings League of Minnesota, testified at the same hearings that the Act
has had an effect on the ability of Minnesota lenders to sell mortgages in the secondary
mortgage market. See id (testimony of John Corbitt). Once the ability to sell mortgages
on the secondary market is hindered, it is difficult for Minnesota lenders to obtain funds to
originate future mortgage loans. See id
128. See Act of May 23, 1983, ch. 215, § 14, 1983 Minn. Laws 654, 657-58 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 583.11 (Supp. 1983)).
129. The Act was originally limited to 13 months. Id § 16, 1983 Minn. Laws at 658.
The Act has recently been extended for 12 months. See supra note 4.
130. See id. § 7, 1983 Minn. Laws at 655-56 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 583.04 (Supp.
1983)).
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property, further lengthening the equitable period of redemption.13 1 The result of the stay and the delay of sale allows the
mortgagor or vendee to reinstate the mortgage or contract by paying only the arrearages, rather than having to obtain outside fi32
nancing in order to redeem.1

Extension of the period of equitable redemption, however, is accompanied by a corresponding reduction of the statutory period of
redemption.1 33 The Act also provides that "in no event shall the
[statutory] redemption period be less than 30 days."'' 34 Therefore,
when all of its various provisions are taken together, the Act provides for only thirty days of relief to qualifying mortgagors or
vendees. Nevertheless, the allocation of the relief between the periods of equitable and statutory redemption is significant, since defaulting mortgagors and contract vendees can postpone the actual
sale of their property.
A.

Blanket Rehief Provisions

The Act contains several provisions affecting foreclosure and termination procedures which apply regardless of any affirmative action by the mortgagor or contract vendee. These provisions extend
the period of equitable redemption, delaying foreclosure or
termination.
The Act simplifies the notice provision for terminating a contract for deed contained in Minnesota Statutes section 559.21 and
provides for either a sixty or ninety-day period.1 35 A defaulting
contract vendee is entitled to ninety days notice if the contract was
entered into after May 1, 1980 and he has paid twenty-five percent
131. Id
132. Mortgagors may reinstate the mortgage at any time before the property is sold by
paying the arrearages. See MINN. STAT. § 580.30 (1982); see also supra note 54 (description
of what constitutes arrearages for purposes of reinstatement). Contract vendees may also
reinstate the contract at any time before the expiration of the notice period. See MINN.
STAT. § 559.21, subd. 4 (1982). To reinstate, the contract vendee "makes all payments
due and owing to the vendor under the contract through the date payment is made and
pays the costs of service, the mortgage registration tax, if actually paid by the vendor, and
attorneys' fees .... " Id.
133. Act of May 23, 1983, ch. 215, § 10, 1983 Minn. Laws 654, 656-57 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 583.07 (Supp. 1983)).
134. Id
135. Id § 2, 1983 Minn. Laws at 654 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 559.21, subd. 6
(Supp. 1983)). The ninety-day period did not change existing law. See, e.g., MINN. STAT.
§ 559.21, subd. 2 (1982).
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or more of the purchase price.' 3 6 All other defaulting vendees are
37
entitled to a minimum of sixty days notice prior to termination.1
The procedure for foreclosing a mortgage is also altered by the
Act. The notice of default requirement is extended from thirty to
sixty days, 138 thus providing the defaulting mortgagor additional
time within which to cure his default.1 39 Where published notice
is required, the length of notice is extended from six to eight
weeks. 140
B. Relief Provisions Available by Petition
Under the Act, defaulting mortgagors and contract vendees
may petition the district court to delay the sale of the property or
postpone termination of the contract, thus extending the redemptory periods. 14 1 Petition may be made by a defaulting mortgagor 42 "at any time after the issuance of the notice of the
foreclosure proceedings and prior to the sale"' 143 of the property, or
136. See Act of May 23, 1983, ch. 215, § 2, 1983 Minn. Laws 654, 654 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 559.21, subd. 6 (Supp. 1983)).

137. See id.
138. See id § 1, 1983 Minn. Laws at 654 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 47.20, subd. 15
(Supp. 1983)). This provision extends the thirty-day requirement of Minnesota Statutes
section 47.20, subdivision 8(3)(c). Thus, the minimum period of equitable redemption is
now sixty days.
139. See MINN. STAT. § 580.03 (1982).
140. See Act of May 23, 1983, ch. 215, § 3, 1983 Minn. Laws 654, 654 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 580.031 (Supp. 1983)).
141. Id. § 7, 1983 Minn. Laws at 655-56 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 583.04 (Supp.
1983)). The petition must be filed in the district court of the county where the mortgage
foreclosure proceedings are pending. See id
142. Id. An owner in possession of the mortgaged premises, anyone claiming under the
mortgage, or anyone liable for the mortgage debt may petition for relief under the Act. See
I.
143. Id. This provision is slightly different from the Act's predecessor which permitted
a mortgagor to apply for relief after foreclosure proceedings were commenced and before
the expiration of the period of statutory redemption. See Act of Apr. 18, 1933, ch. 339, pt.
I, § 2, 1933 Minn. Laws 514, 516.
The provision raises a strategic question of whether to file a petition after receipt of
notice of default or after receipt of a notice of sale. Robert Snyder, an attorney with the
Agricultural Extension Service of the University of Minnesota, has described the choices
available to eligible mortgagors:
The advantage of waiting is that the Notice of Sale establishes a definite date
from which the six- or twelve-month delay can be measured. If the foreclosure
proceedings are stopped prior to publication of the Notice of Sale, no sale date
has yet been established. The court may decide to measure the six- or twelvemonth delay from the date of the hearing on the postponement instead of from
the date of a theoretical sale date that might have been established if the foreclosure proceedings had not been halted. This will reduce the time gained by the
postponement.
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by a defaulting vendee144 where the contract has not yet been terminated. 145 Mortgagors may request postponement of the foreclosure sale for up to six months,1 46 or in the case of a farm homestead
situated on more than ten acres, for up to twelve months. 14 7 Contract vendees may request a delay in the contract termination for
148
up to ninety days.

Petitioning the district court operates as an ex parte stay on further foreclosure or termination proceedings for a period of up to
thirty days. 1 49 The Act provides that "[u]pon receiving the petition, the court shall order a stay in the foreclosure proceedings until after the hearing on the petition."' 150 The Act also provides that
a hearing on the petition must be held within thirty days.151 Thus,
a defaulting mortgagor or vendee can bring the foreclosure or termination proceedings to a grinding halt simply by filing a petition
with the court.
Foreclosing mortgagees and terminating contract vendors are
compensated for the ex parte stay. The defaulting mortgagor or
contract vendee must pay the foreclosing or terminating party the
actual costs, including attorneys' fees, incurred in the foreclosure
or termination proceeding before postponement.1 52 The foreclosing mortgagee and the terminating vendor must also be served
R.

SNYDER, SELF-HELP RELIEF FROM MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE 5 (1984). Mr. Snyder
notes, however, that "[t]he disadvantage of waiting until the Notice of Mortgage Foreclosure Sale has been published is that obtaining the postponement will be more costly." Id
The costs that Mr. Snyder referred to are those which a petitioning mortgagor must pay to
the clerk of court to stay the proceedings. See infra note 152 and accompanying text. If the
mortgagor waits until after receipt of the notice of sale, attorneys' fees, which constitute
the bulk of the required costs, will be increased. See R. SNYDER, stupra, at 5.
144. Act of May 23, 1983, ch. 215, § 7, 1983 Minn. Laws 654, 655-56 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 583.04 (Supp. 1983)). Persons claiming under the contract or liable for the
contract payment may also apply for relief. See id.
145. Id
146. See id.
147. Id
148. See id.
149. See Knapp, supra note 7, at 195.
150. See Act of May 23, 1983, ch. 215, § 7, 1983 Minn. Laws 654, 655-56 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 583.04 (Supp. 1983)).
151. See id.§ 13, 1983 Minn. Laws at 657 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 583.10 (Supp.
1983)).
152. See id.§ 7, 1983 Minn. Laws at 655-56 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 583.04 (Supp.
1983)) (payment is actually made to the clerk of court); see also Knapp, supra note 7, at
195-96 (raises issue of whether attorneys' fees are actually required). If the Act were
amended to permit mortgagors and contract vendees to seek relief before the mortgagee or
contract vendor initiated foreclosure proceedings, these costs could be substantially reduced or eliminated.
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with a verified complaint, a copy of which must be filed with the
53
court before the stay is ordered.1

V.

STANDARDS FOR AWARDING RELIEF

A.

Standards Under the Act

The Act sets standards for awarding relief, providing that the
court "may" consider certain criteria in determining whether to
order a delay in the mortgage foreclosure or the contract termination. 54 These criteria are: "(1) that the petitioner is unemployed,
underemployed or facing economic problems due to low farm
commodity prices; and (2) that the petitioner has an inability to
make payments on the mortgage or contract for deed." 1 55 The
court is not compelled to consider these criteria, but is empowered
to do so at its discretion. This approach is essentially the same as
that used under the Act's predecessor, the 1933 Legislation, which
allowed the courts to self-style their standards.' 56 Since the Act
provides little direction in determining whether to fashion relief,
the courts should look beyond the Act's criteria to sweep deserving
farmers and homeowners under the umbrella of the Act's relief.
B.

Other Standardsfor Consideration

An examination of analogous moratoria legislation illustrates
the inadequacy of Minnesota's standards for awarding relief. Two
more detailed moratoria are presently available: the Farmers
Home Administration moratorium policy 5 7 (FmHA Moratorium)
153. See Act of May 23, 1983, ch. 215, § 7, 1983 Minn. Laws 654, 655-56 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 583.04 (Supp. 1983)).
154. See id § 8, 1983 Minn. Laws at 656 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 583.05 (Supp.
1983)).
155. Id.
156. Under the 1933 Legislation, courts were entitled to award relief if it was "equitable and just to do so." See Act of Apr. 18, 1933, ch. 339, pt. I, § 2, 1933 Minn. Laws 514,
516. One standard the courts developed under the 1933 Legislation was that the mortgagor must have considerable equity before relief was granted. See, e.g., Hoey v. First Nat'l
Bank & Tr. Co., 200 Minn. 366, 274 N.W. 239 (1937); Falk v. Massachusetts Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 196 Minn. 341, 265 N.W. 60 (1936); Shepard v. Midland Lumber & Coal Co.,
196 Minn. 78, 264 N.W. 126 (1936); Rivkin v. Niles, 195 Minn. 635, 263 N.W. 920 (1936).
157. The FmHA currently has three different moratoria on mortgage foreclosure. See,
e.g.,
7 U.S.C. § 1981a (1978); 7 C.F.R. §§ 1951.33, 1915.313 (1983). Section 1981a provides that the FmHA may not foreclose mortgages securing farm loans upon a determination that, "due to circumstances beyond the borrower's control," the borrower is
temporarily unable to continue making scheduled payments without unduly impairing his
or her standard of living. 7 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1978). This moratorium has been subject to
considerable judicial debate in recent years because the Secretary of Agriculture has failed
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and recent moratoria legislation in Connecticut 158 (Connecticut
Moratorium). The federal Emergency Housing Act of 1975159
(Emergency Moratorium) expired of its own volition in 1977,160
but also contained detailed criteria.
The FmHA Moratorium provides the most detailed criteria. It
states that a defaulting mortgagor is entitled to relief upon a determination that, "due to circumstances beyond the borrower's control, the borrower is unable to continue making scheduled
payments without unduly impairing his or her standard of living." 1 6' The term "unduly impaired standard of living" is defined
as "a condition whereby the borrower, due to circumstances beyond the borrower's control, is unable to pay normal living expenses and scheduled payments as provided by the loan
documents."'' 62 To show that his standard of living is impaired, a
borrower "must present evidence that the inability to repay the
loan will probably last for a period of 6 months or more and that
income will be available to resume payment after the moratorium
period."

163

To ascertain "circumstances beyond the borrower's control," the
FmHA Moratorium provides for examination of factors causing
"substantial reduction of income"'' 64 and factors causing extraordito promulgate regulations specifying the standards for determing when relief is available
and the procedures for obtaining such relief. As a result, the Secretary has been required
to promulgate regulations before the FmHA can foreclose mortgages securing farm loans.
See Allison v. Block, 723 F.2d 631, 638 (8th Cir. 1983); Jacoby v. Schuman, 568 F. Supp.
843, 846 (E.D. Mo. 1983); Matzke v. Block, 564 F. Supp. 1157, 1166-67 (D. Kan. 1983);
Curry v. Block, 541 F. Supp. 506, 523-26 (S.D. Ga. 1982). But see Neighbors v. Block, 564
F. Supp. 1075, 1079-80 (E.D. Ark. 1983) (Congress did not intend the establishment of
standards and procedures for section 1981a).
The second FmHA moratorium is contained in title 7, section 1951.33 of the Code of
Federal Regulations and allows county supervisors to either consolidate, reschedule, or
defer installments due on existing farm operating loans. See 7 C.F.R. § 1951.33(b) (1983).
The third FmHA moratorium, and the one referred to in this Article, is contained in
title 7, section 1951.313 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Section 1951.313 authorizes a
moratorium on principal and interest payments on single-family rural housing loans. See
id § 1951.313.
158. Act of June 9, 1983, Pub. Act No. 83-547, §§ 6-12, 1983 Conn. Legis. Serv. Jan.
Sess. 1795, 1800-02 (West), as amendedby Act of June 29, 1983, Pub. Act No. 83-29, §§ 7177, 82, 1983 Conn. Legis. Serv. June Spec. Sess. 2194, 2234-38, 2241 (West), reprnted in
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 547 app. at 299 (West Supp. 1984).
159. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (1976).
160. See id § 2708(b).
161. 7 C.F.R. § 1951.313 (1983).
162. Id. § 1951.313(a)(2).
163. Id
164. See id § 1951.313(a)(2)(i).
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nary expenses which may result in a lien being placed on the borrower's dwelling.1 6 5 Elements to be considered in determining the
existence of the first general factor include: (1) unemployment or
underemployment; 16 6 (2) "[l]oss or reduction in benefits which
constituted a substantial part of the [borrower's] annual income
; )167 (3) "[i]llness, injury, or death of the borrower or other
adult who contributed to annual income . . . ;"168 and (4) situa-

tions where a spouse has lived apart from the financed dwelling
due to divorce 169 or broken marriage. 170 The second general factor

is described as the "need to pay certain essential family expenses
which have resulted or may result in a lien being placed on the
borrower's dwelling, and which if not paid are likely to result in
the loss of the dwelling.' 71 Expenses contemplated under this factor include those resulting from: "(A) Accident, illness, or injury
to the borrower or dependent member of the borrower's family, or
(B) Death of a member of the borrower's family, or (C) Cost or
repairs for uninsured damage to the security if the loss occured
1 72
because adequate insurance coverage was not available."
The standards for relief set forth in the FmHA Moratorium provide a comprehensive approach to delineating potential grounds
for relief. In contrast, the Act fails to articulate detailed standards.
Minnesota courts are given two broad standards upon which to
afford relief, but are not encouraged to look beyond these criteria
to factors similar to those contemplated by the FmHA Moratorium. Thus, mortgagors and contract vendees may not be granted
relief even though they are deserving. Therefore, Minnesota
courts should look past the Act's criteria to those used in other
jurisdictions' moratoria to award appropriate relief to Minnesota
farmers and homeowners.
VI.

BALANCING OF INTERESTS

The ultimate relief available under the Act, a delay in the sale
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

See
Id.
Id
Id
See
See
Id.

id. § 1951.313(a)(2)(ii).
§ 1951.313(a)(2)(i)(A).
§ 1951.313(a)(2)(i)(B).
§ 1951.313(a)(2)(i)(C).
id § 1951.313(a)(2)(i)(D).
id § 1951.313(a)(2)(i)(E).
§ 1951.313(a)(2)(ii).

172. Id.
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of the property, 173 is further constrained by the requirement that
the mortgagor or contract vendee make some partial payment during the delay. 174 Thus, what the Act provides in one section, it
limits in another, effectively mitigating any potential relief. The
determination of partial payment is made by the court with little
direction other than it must be "just and equitable."'' 75 The Connecticut Moratorium offers an alternative to this approach for determining partial payment.
A.

PartialPayment Under the Act

The Act requires the court to determine an amount of partial
payment on the debt to be paid by the petitioning party.176 The
court must ascertain the income or rental value for the payment of
taxes, insurance, and interest and principal on the debt. 1 77 Once
this valuation is made, the court must assess all or part of the
amount against the defaulting party and establish the dates on
which such payments must be made to the mortgagee or contract
vendor. 178 The Act attempts to assist the court in reaching this
determination, providing: "In determining the amount of income
or rental value to be paid, the court may consider the relative financial conditions and resources of the parties and the ability of
the mortgagor or contract vendee to pay."' 7 9 The Act offers further guidance to the court by providing that a determination is
proper if made in a "just and equitable manner."'180
The Act clarifies its definition of a "just and equitable manner,"
providing that, in the case of contracts for deed, the court "insure
the payment required by the contract vendee is sufficient to adeUndoubtquately maintain the vendor's standard of living."''
edly, the legislature contemplated individual vendors as opposed
to corporations or other business entities in enacting this provision.
Since the Act does not provide similar protection for an individual
mortagee's standard of living, the legislature apparently was either
173.
MINN.
174.
1983)).
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

See Act of May 23, 1983, ch. 215, § 10, 1983 Minn. Laws 654, 656-57 (codified at
STAT. § 583.07 (Supp. 1983)).
See id § 11, 1983 Minn. Laws at 657 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 583.08 (Supp.
See
See
Id
See
Id
Id
Id

id.
id.
id

"Standard of living," however, is not clearly defined in the Act.
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unaware of his existence or unconcerned by his plight.182
Finally, the Act limits all relief granted by providing that:
No postponement or extension shall be ordered under conditions which would substantially diminish or impair the value of
the contract or obligation of the person against whom the relief
is sought without reasonable allowance to justify the exercise of
the police power . . .or which would cause irreparable harm

or undue hardship to any mortgagee, contract vendor, judg83
ment creditor, or their successors or assigns.'
This provision was undoubtedly included to give the Act constitu8 4 When combined with the other limitations
tional imprimatur.1
set forth, the provision works to engulf the relief available on the
face of the Act.
B.

PartialPayment Under the Connecticut Moratorium- A Comparison

The Connecticut Moratorium 8 5 also attempts to balance the
competing interests of mortgagors and mortgagees. This balancing is somewhat easier for Connecticut courts to accomplish than
the balancing suggested under the Act because the Connecticut
86
Moratorium covers only mortgages held by institutional lenders.1
182. Under the 1933 Legislation, Act of Apr. 18, 1933, ch. 339, 1933 Minn. Laws 514,
courts were cognizant of the rights of individual mortgagees in awarding relief to defaulting mortgagors. See Frissel Co. v. O'Brien, 204 Minn. 398, 283 N.W. 756 (1939); Hoey v.
First Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co., 200 Minn. 366, 274 N.W. 239 (1937); First Nat'l Bank v.
Hammill, 195 Minn. 185, 262 N.W. 160 (1935); Young v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 192
Minn. 446, 256 N.W. 906 (1934). The drafters of the Act apparently looked to this line of
cases in providing for protection of the contract vendor. The legislature either overlooked
individual mortgagees in excluding them from similar protection or the legislature's rationale for excluding mortgagees, in light of a strong judicial concern over their interest,
was nonsensical.
183. Act of May 23, 1983, ch. 215, § 14, 1983 Minn. Laws 654, 657-58 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 583.11 (Supp. 1983)).
184. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
185. Act of June 9, 1983, Pub. Act No. 83-547, §§ 6-12, 1983 Conn. Legis. Serv. Jan.
Sess. 1795, 1800-02 (West), as amended by Act of June 29, 1983, Pub. Act No. 83-29, §§ 7177, 82, 1983 Conn. Legis. Serv. June Spec. Sess. 2194, 2234-38, 2241 (West), reprinted in
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 547 app. at 299 (West Supp. 1984).
186. Seeid § 7, 1983 Conn. Legis. Serv. Jan. Sess. at 1800 (West), as amended by Act of
June 29, 1983, Pub. Act No. 83-29, § 72, 1983 Conn. Legis. Serv. June Spec. Sess. 2194,
2235 (West), repnntedin CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 547 app. at 300 (West Supp. 1984).
The Connecticut Moratorium originally affected only financial institutions which it defined as "a state bank and trust company, savings bank, savings and loan association,
credit union, or any federally chartered banking institution." Id § 6(5), 1983 Conn. Legis.
Serv. Jan. Sess. at 1800 (West), as amended by Act of June 29, 1983, Pub. Act No. 83-29,
§ 71(5), 1983 Conn. Legis. Serv. June Spec. Sess. 2194, 2235 (West). The moratorium was
amended to apply to "lenders" instead of "financial institutions." A lender is defined as
"any person who makes or holds mortgage loans in the ordinary course of business and
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The Connecticut Moratorium requires the court to consider "any
substantial prejudice to the lender" in awarding relief.18 7 It also
grants the court discretion to order partial payment by the mortgagor.18 8 The amount of payment ordered by the court cannot
exceed twenty-five percent of the mortgagor's net income per
month.18 9 This provision is designed to "demonstrat[e] the homeowner's good faith effort to reduce his mortgage indebtedness."' 190
Connecticut's moratorium works well in balancing the interests
of the parties. The discretionary nature of its partial payment statute stands in stark contrast to the Minnesota Act's mandatory provision. 19 ' Furthermore, the twenty-five percent limitation on
partial payment fixes the maximum amount that a defaulting
mortgagor must pay during the relief period. The twenty-five percent cap also makes it easier for the court to ascertain a proper
amount of partial payment. The court can order the maximum
partial payment of twenty-five percent of the mortgagor's net income, unless the mortgagor demonstrates that the amount should
be less. Thus, Connecticut courts are not burdened with the assignment of determining a "just and equitable" amount of partial
192
payment as are the Minnesota courts.
VII.

READING BETWEEN THE LINES

Although the Act is rather circuitous in providing only thirty
days of relief, it unintentionally affects other areas of Minnesota
real property law. One area affected by the Act is the six or
who is the holder of any first mortgage on residential real estate which is the subject of a
foreclosure action." Act of June 29, 1983, Pub. Act No. 83-29, § 71(5), 1983 Conn. Legis.
Serv. June Spec. Sess. 2194, 2235 (West) (amending Act of June 9, 1983, Pub. Act No. 83547, § 6(5), 1983 Conn. Legis. Serv. Jan. Sess. 1795, 1800 (West)), reprintedin CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. ch. 547 app. at 300 (West Supp. 1984). The new definition is narrow enough
to include only institutional lenders.
187. Act of June 9, 1983, Pub. Act No. 83-547, § 8(c)(5), 1983 Conn. Legis. Serv. Jan.
Sess. 1795, 1800-01 (West), as amended by Act of June 29, 1983, Pub. Act No. 83-29,
§ 73(c)(5), 1983 Conn. Legis. Serv. June Spec. Sess. 2194, 2236 (West), reprintedin CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 547 app. at 300-01 (West Supp. 1984).
188. Id § 10, 1983 Conn. Legis. Serv. Jan. Sess. at 1801 (West), as amended by Act of
June 29, 1983, Pub. Act No. 83-29, § 75, 1983 Conn. Legis. Serv. June Spec. Sess. 2194,
2237 (West), reprintedin CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 547 app. at 302 (West Supp. 1984).
189. Id
190. Id
191. Compare id with Act of May 23, 1983, ch. 215, § 11, 1983 Minn. Laws 654, 657
(codified at MINN. STAT. § 583.08 (Supp. 1983)).
192. Under the Act, the court must order some amount of partial payment and the
burden of assessing the amount falls on the court. See Act of May 23, 1983, ch. 215, § 11,
1983 Minn. Laws 654, 657 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 583.08 (Supp. 1983)).
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twelve-month period of statutory redemption provided in Minnesota Statutes section 580.23.193 Another affected area is the enforceability of the power of sale clause contained in most
mortgages. Finally, the Act's provisions may become permanent
or lay the groundwork for an immutable extension of existing redemptory or reinstatement provisions.
,4.

Statutoy Redemption: Section 580.23

Minnesota Statutes section 580.23 sets forth two distinct periods
of statutory redemption. The section provides for a period of six
months,19 4 unless one of three conditions is met:
(a) The mortgage was executed prior to July 1, 1967, or;
(b) The amount claimed to be due and owing as of the date of
the notice of foreclosure sale is less than 66 2/3 percent of the
original principal amount secured by the mortgage; or,
(c) The mortgaged premises, as of the date of the execution of
the mortgage, exceeded ten acres in size.' 95
If one of the three conditions is satisfied, the period of redemption
is twelve months.19 6 This section governs the length of statutory
redemption regardless of the method of foreclosure. 197
Section 580.23 also limits the ability of mortgagees to maintain
actions for deficiency judgments against defaulting mortgagors. If
the six-month period applies, the mortgagee purchasing at the
foreclosure sale waives his right to a deficiency judgment.19 The
prospect of being barred from a deficiency judgment is particularly alarming to a mortgagee in a declining real estate market,
because the possibility of having the purchase price at the foreclosure sale bid up to the amount of the mortgage declines correspondingly. Deficiency judgments are available, however, if the
twelve-month redemptory period is available under section
580.23.199 Thus, in many instances, the incentive exists for mortgagees to attempt to apply the twelve-month period.
In American National Bank v. Blaeser,2 00 the Minnesota Supreme
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
closure
198.
199.
200.

See MINN. STAT. § 580.23 (1982).
See id. § 580.23, subd. 1.
Id § 580.23, subd. 2.
Id
See id. § 581.10 (redemption periods specified in section 580.23 also apply to foreby action).
Id § 580.23, subd. 1.
See id. § 580.23, subd. 2.
326 N.W.2d 163 (Minn. 1982).
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Court addressed an attempt by a mortgagee to use the twelvemonth period of redemption to obtain a deficiency judgment. Although the mortgaged property in Blaeser did not meet one of the
three conditions necessary to qualify for a twelve-month redemptory period, 20 1 the mortgagee specified in the foreclosure documents that twelve months was the applicable period. 20 2 The
mortgagee foreclosed by advertisement after the mortgagor defaulted.2 0 3 The property was eventually sold at a sheriff's sale and
the mortgagee was the highest bidder. 2 4 The proceeds of the sale,
however, were considerably less than the amount of the note.20 5
Therefore, the mortgagee commenced a suit against the mortgagor
20 6
for a deficiency judgment.
The Blaeser court held that the mortgagee was not entitled to
maintain an action for a deficiency judgment. 20 7 The court's holding was premised on the language of section 580.23 which it found
to prohibit unambiguously a mortgagee's election between the six
or twelve-month period.208 The court also relied on its perception
of the legislature's intent in enacting section 580.23: "The statute
manifests legislative intent that the redemption period be 6
months unless the facts dictate the application of the exceptions set
out in subd. 2."209 Thus, under the Blaeser rationale, a mortgagee
may not elect between the six or twelve-month period. Rather, the
period of redemption will be six months unless the property qualifies under one of the three conditions for the twelve-month period.
Although Blaeser was decided before the Act, the decision may
have been mitigated by the Act, which provides: "If the parties to
a foreclosure action agree in writing to a compromise settlement
thereof, or of composition of the mortgage indebtedness, or both,
the court shall have jurisdiction and may by its order confirm and
approve the settlement or composition, or both, as the case may
be."' 2 10 Since the very nature of the relief provided by the Act is
the extension of time, this provision is apparently broad enough to
201. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
202. 326 N.W.2d at 164.
203. Id
204. Id
205. Id
206. Id
207. See id at 165.
208. See id
209. Id
210. Act of May 23, 1983, ch. 215, § 9, 1983 Minn. Laws 654, 656 (codified at MINN.
STAT. § 583.06 (Supp. 1983)).
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contemplate a compromise regarding the length of the redemptory
period. The objective of any petitioning mortgagor is to obtain
more time to either cure the default or redeem the foreclosed property. The trade-off for the mortgagee is the ability to obtain a
deficiency judgment.
The Blaeser court stated that the three conditions of section
580.23 were unique circumstances "involv[ing] special equities
favoring a longer [redemptory] period."' 2 1' Nevertheless, the court
held that "[t]hese exceptions represent legislative judgments that
when such facts exist the mortgagor is more likely to redeem and,
therefore, the inefficiencies incident to the longer redemption pe21 2
riod are warranted."
The rationale of the Act is strikingly similar to the Blaeser court's
reading of section 580.23. The Act permits a court to grant relief
on the basis of special equitable considerations.2 1 3 The Act also
requires the court to consider the position of the mortgagee and
ensure that its interests are not detrimentally affected by the relief
provided. 21 4 In essence, the Act allows the court to fashion relief
based on equitable grounds within fixed boundaries, while section
580.23 lists three specific equitable grounds upon which to fashion
such relief in the absence of judicial supervision. The Act apparently represents a legislative judgment that the three conditions of
section 580.23 are no longer exhaustive. Rather, the court is free
to approve an agreement between the parties within fixed limitations. Conceivably, an agreement could provide for a twelvemonth redemptory period with concurrent liability on the part of
the mortgagor for a deficiency judgment.
.

The Power of Sale Clause

The Act may also usurp the mortgagee's ability to foreclose by
advertisement pursuant to a power of sale clause. The process afforded by the Act, which permits defaulting mortgagors to seek
relief from the courts, has the dual effect of converting the procedure to foreclosure by action and obviating the function of the
2 15
power of sale clause.
211.
212.
213.
MINN.
214.
1983)).
215.

Blaeser, 326 N.W.2d at 165.
Id
See Act of May 23, 1983, ch. 215, § 8, 1983 Minn. Laws 654, 656 (codified at
STAT. § 583.05 (Supp. 1983)).
See id § 14, 1983 Minn. Laws at 657-58 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 583.11 (Supp.
The 1933 Legislation also had the effect of obviating the power of sale clause
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A power of sale clause "provides for a non-judicial sale conducted after advertising, serving and posting of notice of sale as
specified in the mortgage and applicable state law.

' 2 16

Chapter

580 of the Minnesota Statutes governs this process known as foreclosure by advertisement. 2

7

Foreclosure by advertisement can be

achieved in a relatively short time frame.2 ' 8 The Act extends the
time frame, which, in essence, is the required period of notice,
220
from siX2 19 to eight weeks.
Foreclosure by action, on the other hand, involves a lengthy process, 22 1 and is often disfavored by foreclosing mortgagees. Foreclosure by action, however, has one attraction for foreclosing
mortgagees; it permits the mortgagee to maintain an action for a
deficiency judgment. 222 As the court in Blaeser noted, "should the
[mortgagee] wish to purchase the real estate and obtain a deficiency judgment under facts where the 6-month redemption period applies, it must

foreclose by action.

' 22 3

The rationale

underlying the availability of deficiency judgments in foreclosure
by action, which are otherwise unavailable in foreclosure by advertisement, is the role of the court. The presence of the court in
foreclosure by action provides protection for defaulting
224
mortgagors.
The Act provides defaulting mortgagors with direct access to the
protection of the court after the mortgagee selects its form of foreclosure. Once the action is before the court, however, the court
can fashion relief just as if the mortgagee had foreclosed by action.
Thus, the Act permits mortgagors to avoid a power of sale clause
and forces mortgagees into foreclosure by action.
which prevented foreclosure by advertisement. See Prosser, supra note 95, at 362 n.59.
Prosser noted that "[a] similar Minnesota law passed in 1877 was held unconstitutional in
O'Brien v. Krenz, 36 Minn. 136, 30 N.W. 458 (1886)." Id
216. R. KRATOVIL & R. WERNER, supra note 34, § 41.08, at 601.
217. See MINN. STAT. §§ 580.01-.30 (1982 & Supp. 1983).
218. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
219. MINN. STAT. § 580.03 (1982).
220. Act of May 23, 1983, ch. 215, § 3, 1983 Minn. Laws 654, 654 (codified at MINN.
STAT. § 580.031 (Supp. 1983)).
221. See R. KRATOVIL & R. WERNER, supra note 34, § 41.08(a)(1), at 601. Foreclosure
by action is a lengthy process because it requires the mortgagee to bring a suit in a district
court to obtain a judgment against the defaulting mortgagor. Aside from the inherent
delay in crowded court calendars, district court judgments are governed by the rules of
civil procedure which permit appeals to be taken.
222. See MINN. STAT. §§ 581.09-.10 (1982).
223. 326 N.W.2d at 165.
224. See R. KRATOVIL & R. WERNER, supra note 34, § 41.08(a)(1), at 601.
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The drawback for mortgagors is that mortgagors effectively expose themselves to deficiency judgments. The Act apparently contemplates this result, providing that "[n]o action shall be
maintained for a deficiency judgment until the period of redemption as allowed by section 580.23 . . .has expired.

' 225

Thus, the

Act does not prohibit mortgagees from maintaining actions for deficiency judgment; it merely requires mortgagees to wait until the
applicable period of statutory redemption has expired.
This concept is distinctly similar to the language contained in
Minnesota Statutes chapter 581 which governs foreclosure by action. 226 Section 581.10 specifies that the applicable redemptory
period is that which is set forth in section 580.23.227 Section 581.09

provides that an action for a deficiency judgment may be maintained after expiration of the redemptory period. 228 Thus, a petition filed by a defaulting mortgagor under the Act converts the
foreclosure proceeding to one by action rather than by advertisement. If the Act permits a conversion to foreclosure by action,
then according to the Blaeser decision, 22 9 the mortgagee may maintain an action for a deficiency judgment.
C

Groundworkfor ProlongedEffect

The Act provides for a limited duration. 2 30 While such a provision is necessary in any piece of legislation impairing contractual
relationships pursuant to the exercise of the state's police power, 23 1
the Act may lay the foundation for extension of the redemptory
periods.
The Act's predecessor, the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium
Law enacted in 1933, was also a temporary piece of emergency
legislation designed to expire two years after its enactment. 232 Yet
it was extended by a series of acts 233 until July 1, 1942.234 The
225. Act of May 23, 1983, ch. 215, § 11, 1983 Minn. Laws 654, 657 (codified at MINN.
STAT. § 583.08 (Supp. 1983)).
226. See MINN. STAT. §§ 581.01-.12 (1982).

227. See id.§ 581.10.
228. See id.§ 581.09.
229. See 326 N.W.2d at 165.
230. Act of May 23, 1983, ch. 215, § 16, 1983 Minn. Laws 654, 658.
231. The Blaisdell Court focused on the limited duration of the 1933 Legislation which
was only two years. See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 441, 447.
232. See Act of Apr. 18, 1933, ch. 339, pt. II, § 9, 1933 Minn. Laws 514, 522.
233. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 15, 1935, ch. 47, 1935 Minn. Laws 47; Act of Feb. 13, 1937,
ch. 21, 1937 Minn. Laws 52; Act of Feb. 4, 1939, ch. 7, 1939 Minn. Laws 9; Act of Feb. 28,
1941, ch. 38, 1941 Minn. Laws 42.
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Minnesota Legislature has recently extended the Act for an addi235
tional year and may extend the Act similarly in the future.
Thus, the Act may not be a temporary measure that will expire
long before defaulting mortgagors or contract vendees will need to
take advantage of its relief. Rather, the Act may have a prolonged
effect on Minnesota real property.
VIII.

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Although the Act provides relief to troubled mortgagors and
contract vendees, it provides only a stop gap measure in reconciling the difficult social and economic ramifications of the current
malaise in farm and home ownership. As it now reads, the Act
merely delays the inevitable-mortgage foreclosure or contract
termination. The defaulting mortgagor, for example, is still required to tender the full amount of his arrearage in payments,
which after twelve months can be a considerable sum, or he may
fail to do so and allow the mortgagee to sell the property. After
the sale, the mortgagor must locate other financing in order to redeem; financing which will undoubtedly be difficult to obtain.
Thus, by merely delaying the inevitable, the Act fails to provide a
comprehensive solution.
A.

"Fresh Start" Concept

The purpose of a mortgage foreclosure moratorium deserves reexamination. The purpose should be permanent correction of the
problem rather than mere postponement of the inevitable. A permanent solution would provide troubled farmers or homeowners
with a "fresh start" or at least an opportunity to prevent their
debts from compounding during the moratorium period.2 36 Two
fundamental considerations must be addressed in effectuating this
purpose. First, the mortgagor's equity must be preserved. Second,
the mortgagee must not bear the undue burden of protecting the
mortgagor. The concepts underlying reamortization and reverse
annuity mortgages can accommodate these fundamental considerations and can be used to provide a "fresh start" to mortgagors or
234. See Act of Feb. 28, 1941, ch. 38, pt. II, § 9, 1941 Minn. Laws 42, 51.
235. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
236. This purpose is analogous to the goals of the present bankruptcy system. For a
general discussion of mortgage default in bankruptcy proceedings, see Comment, Home
Foreclosures Under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 30 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 637 (1983).
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contract vendees defaulting on institutional financing.237
1. Reamorization
The FmHA Moratorium uses a reamortization approach. 2 38 At
the expiration of the final moratorium period, 239 the mortgagor
can apply to have the entire mortgage debt reamortized if he has
made payments on at least ten percent of the loan 240 and cannot
satisfy the arrearages. 241 The unpaid principal and interest on the
loan balance can either be amortized within the original term of
the loan 242 or reamortized over the remaining term of the loan
plus the time in which the moratorium was effective. 243 Under the
FmHA Moratorium, the interest rate for the reamortized loan re244
mains unchanged.
The Connecticut Moratorium follows a similar approach. 245 It
directs the court to "restructure" the mortgage debt, providing
that "[t]he amount of the mortgage debt at the end of any period
of restructuring shall in no event exceed the amount of the original
mortgage debt. '246 The stated purpose of the Connecticut legislation is "to eliminate an arrearage in payments on the mortgage
debt .... ,,247 The Connecticut Moratorium postpones foreclo237. The concepts of reamortization and reverse annuity mortgages may also apply to
contract for deed or mortgage financing through private individuals. Nevertheless, private individuals are less likely to be able to suffer through the rescheduling of payments.
Therefore, the Act's present balancing approach should be maintained for property financed through individuals.
238. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 1951.313(e)(1)(ii)-(iii), 1915.314 (1983).
239. See id § 1951.314(a)(2). Mortgagors can obtain an initial six-month moratorium
and may also seek extensions, the total of which cannot exceed three years. See id.
§ 1951.313(b)(4)-(5).
240. See id § 1951.314(a)(1).
241. See id.§ 1951.313(e)(1)(ii)-(iii).
242. See id § 1951.313(e)(1)(ii).
243. See id § 1951.313(e)(1)(iii).
244. See id.§ 1951.314(b)(5).
245. See, e.g., Act of June 9, 1983, Pub. Act No. 83-547, §§ 6-12, 1983 Conn. Legis.
Serv. Jan. Sess. 1795, 1800-02 (West),as amended by Act of June 29, 1983, Pub. Act No. 8329, §§ 71-77, 82, 1983 Conn. Legis. Serv. June Spec. Sess. 2194, 2234-38, 2241 (West),
reprinted in CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 547 app. at 299 (West Supp. 1984).
246. Id.§ 11(a), 1983 Conn. Legis. Serv. Jan. Sess. at 1801 (West), as amended by Act of
June 29, 1983, Pub. Act No. 83-29, § 76(6), 1983 Conn. Legis. Serv. June Spec. Sess. 2194,
2238 (West), reprnted in CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 547 app. at 302 (West Supp. 1984).
247. Id § 9(a), 1983 Conn. Legis. Serv. Jan. Sess. at 1801 (West), as amended by Act of
June 29, 1983, Pub. Act No. 83-29, § 74, 1983 Conn. Legis. Serv. June Spec. Sess. 2194,
2236-37 (West), reprintedin CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 547 app. at 302 (West Supp.
1984).
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sure for

six248 months. At the end of this period, the mortgagor
resumes payments on the mortgage debt, which are slightly higher
than his original payments, to compensate the mortgagee for lost
revenue during the moratorium period.
The FmHA and Connecticut moratoria minimize the possibility
that the mortgagor will again default on the mortgage debt. The
moratoria assist the mortgagor through a difficult economic period
without cancelling any part of the debt. The mortgagor resumes
his mortgage payments with a "fresh start." Thus, the mortgagor's
equity is preserved without unduly burdening the mortgagee.

2.

Reverse Annuity Mortgages

Another method to provide defaulting mortgagors with a "fresh
start" exists in the concept used in reverse annuity mortgages
(RAMs). The reverse annuity mortgage has been used by elderly
homeowners who have paid all or nearly all of the mortgage debt
on their homes. The RAM approach converts home equity,
offering:
[A] loan from an institutional lender to an older homeowner in
the form of monthly draws or disbursements. Under the
[RAM] program, home equity serves as collateral, and the
lender pays a fixed amount to the borrower every month for a
scheduled number of years. Each payment enlarges the loan
balance on which interest is charged. The monthly payment is
determined by the appraisal value of the home, the term of the
loan, and the age of the borrower. The loan must be paid off or
renegotiated at maturity.

249

Although the RAM approach has been used for mortgagors who
248. Id. § 9(b), 1983 Conn. Legis. Serv. Jan. Sess. at 1801 (West), as amended by Act of
June 29, 1983, Pub. Act No. 83-29, § 74, 1983 Conn. Legis. Serv. June Spec. Sess. 2194,
2236-37 (West), reprinted in CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 547 app. at 302 (West Supp.
1984). Six months is the mandatory period of relief if the mortgagor is unemployed. See
id.
249. Comment, The Effect of Reverse Annuity Mortgages on SSI 16 U.C.D. L. REv. 435,
441 (1983) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Reverse Annuity Mortgages];
see also R. KRATOVIL & R. WERNER, supra note 34, § 29.02(d), at 468-72; Browne, Alternatve Mortgage Instruments, in MORTGAGES AND ALTERNATE MORTGAGE INSTRUMENTS,
437, 462-63 (P.L.I. Real Estate Law And Practice No. 187, 1981); Draper, Alternate Mortgage Instruments, in MORTGAGES AND ALTERNATE MORTGAGE INSTRUMENTS, 319, 335-3 7
(P.L.I. Real Estate Law And Practice No. 187, 1981); Hagel, Home Equity Conversion Programs: Are Thy Compatible with Public Entitlement Programs, 15 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 254
(1981); Izeman, Alternative Mortgage Instruments. Their Eect on ResidentialFinancing, 10 REAL
EST. L.J. 3, 23-25 (1981); Sweat, Mortgages and Alternative Mortgage Instruments, in MORTGAGES AND ALTERNATE MORTGAGE INSTRUMENTS, 13, 29 (P.L.I. Real Estate Law And

Practice No. 187, 1981); Note, Reverse Annuity Mortgages and the Due-on-Sale Clause, 32 STAN.
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have paid off their mortgages, the concept could also apply to
farmers and homeowners facing mortgage foreclosure. As noted
throughout this Article, the goal of Minnesota's foreclosure process, including the provisions of the Act, is to protect farmers and
homeowners from losing their equity. At the time of foreclosure,
the largest asset undoubtedly owned by a mortgagor is his farm or
home, just as the elderly person benefiting from a RAM is "houserich and cash-poor. ' 250 The RAM concept should therefore be
considered as an alternative method of preventing foreclosure and
maintaining owner equity without detrimentally affecting the in25 1
terests of institutional lenders.
In general terms, the RAM concept could be used in mortgage
moratoria. Rather than providing an annuity to mortgagors, the
mortgage itself would be reversed upon a mortgagor's application
to a court. In effect, the mortgagee would impute monthly mortgage payments to the mortgagor by fictionally transferring a fixed
amount at designated intervals. 252 The process would continue
until the mortgagor was able to resume payments on the mortgage
debt. To ensure that sufficient time is available for the mortgagor
to remedy the circumstances affecting his inability to make payments, a minimum amount of equity must be established. For example, the amount of equity necessary to trigger the reverse
mortgage could be the equivalent of the sum of twelve monthly
mortgage payments. If the mortgagor were unable to resume making payments before his equity was reduced to zero, the mortgagee
would take title upon its last imputed payment.
The preceding approach provides mortgagors time to remedy
the circumstances causing their inability to make mortgage payments. It also protects their investment in the property. Each
month that the mortgagor remains in possession, the imputed payments serve as rent. The imputed payments also obviate the need
for the mortgagor to struggle to make partial payments during the
delay of the foreclosure. If the equity is reduced to zero, the mortgagor has not lost his equity, rather he has paid rent for the use of
L. REV. 143 (1979); Comment, The New Mortgages A FunctionalLegalAnalys , 10 FLA. ST.
U.L. REV. 95, 110 (1982).
250. See Comment, Reverse Annuity Mortgages, supra note 249, at 435.
251. Again, the RAM approach may not be helpful where individual mortgagees or
contract vendors are involved. As suggested earlier, the current balancing of interest approach used in the Act should be maintained in these instances. See supra note 237.
252. See K. SCHOLEN & Y. CHEN, UNLOCKING HOME EQUITy FOR THE ELDERLY 108
(1980), cited in Comment, Reverse Annuity Mortgages, supra note 249, at 438 n.27.
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53

The reverse mortgage approach does not cause unreasonable
harm to institutional lenders. Mortgagees are able to realize the
full amount of their loan and are able to acquire the secured property in a time frame no longer than most redemptory periods.
Mortgagees may raise the concern that the reverse mortgage approach affects the stability of their loan portfolios.2

54

The lenders'

concerns, however, could be addressed under the reverse mortgage
approach. The interest rate could be adjusted at the time the
mortgagor applies for relief. The mortgagor could then be compelled to pay the difference between the amount of the imputed
payment to him, which would reflect a new interest rate, and the
amount of his old payment. This minimal amount could be paid
by the mortgagor when he is able to turn the mortgage around or
it could be added to the outstanding principal on the note.
25 5
Recent legislation extends the authority of national banks

253. In essence, the RAM approach could be used to create a residential sale-leaseback
arrangement. Although federal tax law hampers true residential sale-leaseback, legislation
is currently pending in Congress to permit this form of home equity conversion. See Harney, Sale-leaseback would release homeowners'equity in house, Minneapolis Star & Trib., Feb. 18,
1984, at 1S, col. 6.
One drawback for the mortgagor, and for the mortgagee in a falling real estate market, is that he is not compensated for the appreciation of the mortgaged property, since the
starting point for reversing the mortgage is his equity in the property. This is a problem of
valuation only if the equity is reduced to zero. The valuation problem can be ameliorated
by determining either an appraised or fair market value of the property at the time the
mortgagor seeks relief. This valuation could be converted to a percentage which could be
used to multiply the amount of equity. The valuation problem could also be resolved
after the process of reversing mortgage payments has been completed. When the lender
takes title, it will turn around and sell the property. This produces a true fair market
value which can be used to determine the amount of the mortgagor's appreciation in the
property. Once the amount of appreciation is ascertained, the lender could be compelled
to tender the amount to the mortgagor.
254. This concern has been asserted by mortgagees and recognized by courts in recent
due-on-sale clause litigation. See, e.g., Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458
U.S. 141 (1982); Gate Co. v. Midwest Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 324 N.W.2d 202 (Minn.
1982). The term "disintermediation" encompasses this concern and is defined as:
The process of individuals investing their funds directly instead of placing
their savings with banks, savings and loan associations, and similar institutions
for investment by such institutions. This bypassing of financial institutions occurs when proportionately higher yields are available on secure investments
(such as high grade corporate bonds and government securities) than can be
obtained on savings deposits. Disintermediation has a direct influence on the
scarcity of mortgage money since diverted savings rarely find their way into
mortgages.

J.

REILLY, THE LANGUAGE OF REAL ESTATE 121 (1977).

255. Through a number of provisions, the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions
Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1983), extends the lending authority of na-
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and state financial institutions 256 to make reverse mortgages. In
Minnesota, the reverse mortgage approach could be implemented
with minor adjustments to existing financial institution laws.
Minnesota Statutes section 47.58 authorizes lenders 257 to make reverse mortgage loans provided that the "total of committed principal of the investment in reverse mortgage loans . . . does not

exceed five percent of that lender's total deposits and savings accounts.

' 258

Section 47.58 also requires that the lender have a first

259
lien on the property which qualifies for homestead credit.
Section 47.58 requires that the appraisal value of the property
be used at the inception of the loan. 260 It also requires that the
committed principal of the loan not exceed eighty percent of the
appraised value.26 ' In essence, the statute sets forth a minimum
amount of equity, which also includes appreciation and other financing on the property of at least twenty percent. Interest may
be set at the maximum lawful interest rate 262 and the borrower
must pay taxes, insurance premiums, and assessments on the prop-

erty. 263 Section 47.58 also provides that "[t]he borrower may can-

cel the reverse mortgage loan at any time without penalty by
' 26 4
payment of the outstanding loan balance."

The reverse mortgage scheme outlined above will work within
the provisions of section 47.58 with one exception: section 47.58
would have to be amended to permit the mortgagor to cancel the
reverse mortgage arrangement once he began to make payments.
Use of the reverse mortgage concept in moratoria legislation would
then work to protect a mortgagor's equity giving him a "fresh
start" once he was able to make payments, without adversely affecting the mortgagee's interests.
tional banks to make reverse annuity mortgages. Comment, Reverse Annuity Mortgages,
supra note 249, at 443 n.43.
256. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 47.58 (1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-41-115(5) (Supp.

1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-9g (West 1981).
257. Lenders are defined to include state chartered banks, savings and loans associations, and insurance companies, as well as "any federally chartered bank supervised by the
comptroller of the currency or federally chartered savings and loan association supervised
MINN. STAT. § 47.58, subd. 1(b) (1982).
by the federal home loan bank board .
258. Id. § 47.58, subd. 2.
259. See id
260. See id § 47.58, subd. 3.
261. See id
262. See id § 47.58, subd. 5.
263. See id § 47.58, subd. 6.
264. Id § 47.58, subd. 4.
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Guaranty Fund

The Minnesota Legislature could broaden the relief afforded by
the Act with a state guaranty fund. This fund could be used to
ameliorate lenders' concerns under the existing scheme or under
the two new approaches suggested above. Unlike the FmHA Moratorium, where the lender itself has elected to provide relief from
mortgage foreclosure, the Act impairs the contracts of private
lenders. To reconcile lenders' concerns and assure constitutionality, 265 any impairment must be reasonable with respect to the
problem it is designed to resolve. With the state insuring the obligations of the mortgagor, legislation could provide greater relief,
since the unreasonableness of the impairment would be mitigated
by the presence of insurance against financial loss.
The Emergency Moratorium 266 provided a fund 26 7 that served
as a source of indirect payments to defaulting mortgagors 268 and as
an insurance fund to financial institutions that extended credit to
defaulting mortgagors. 269 The insurance fund served as an incentive to financial institutions to extend credit to troubled
homeowners.
Minnesota could adopt a similar approach in its efforts to provide relief from mortgage foreclosure and contract for deed termi270
nation. The existing assurance fund for torrens property
provides one possible source of funding for an insurance program.
Unlike Emergency Moratorium, which induced lenders to extend
credit, under Minnesota's moratorium, lenders would be com265. See supra note t1 and accompanying text.
266. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (1976). The Emergency Moratorium expired of its own
volition on September 30, 1977. Id. § 2708(b).
267. Id. § 2706.
268. Id. § 2705. Rather than payments going directly to defaulting mortgagors, the
mortgage payments were paid directly to the mortgagee on behalf of the mortgagor. See
id § 2705(a). The maximum amount of assistance available was $250 each month. Id.
§ 2703(b). Assistance was available for up to two years. Id § 2703(c)-(d).
269. Id. § 2704. This insurance fund covered "banks, trust companies, finance companies, mortgage companies, savings and loan associations, insurance companies, credit unions, and such other financial institutions . . . against losses which they may sustain as a
result of emergency loans or advances of credit . . . with respect to mortgages eligible for
assistance ....
" Id § 2704(a).
270. See MINN. STAT. § 508.75 (1982). Proponents of the Act attempted to introduce a
guaranty fund into the Act's provisions in the 1984 legislative session, but were unsuccessful. Proponents suggested that the Minnesota Housing Financing Agency and the Commissioner of Agriculture administer a guaranty fund insuring the payment of deferred
amounts to mortgagors or contract vendees. The proposal called for a separate appropriation and was never introduced.
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pelled to stay foreclosure proceedings. The length of the stay
could be extended since the state would insure any losses incurred
by the lender after the foreclosure process expired. Thus, the impairment would be all the more "reasonable," and the length of
the delay in sale or extension of the statutory redemption period
could possibly be extended. The Minnesota Legislature could
then consider providing more than thirty days of relief to defaulting mortgagors or contract vendees.
C

Notice of Available Relief

One of the Act's major drawbacks is that very few financially
distressed farmers and homeowners are aware of its existence,2 7 '
since terminating contract vendors and foreclosing mortgagees are
not required to inform defaulting parties of the available relief
under the Act. The Connecticut Moratorium 2 72 and the FmHA
Moratorium 2

73

both require that notice of available relief be given

at the commencement of foreclosure proceedings. The Act should
2 74
be amended to provide a similar notice requirement.
IX.

CONCLUSION

Minnesota's moratorium on mortgage foreclosure arrived in the
midst of considerable attention over the plight of real property
owners facing mortgage foreclosure or contract for deed termination. The Act, however, inadequately addresses the real needs of
those it was designed to protect. Thirty days of additional relief
provides a defaulting party with little opportunity to cure his default. Furthermore, by seeking relief under the Act, a mortgagor
may expose himself to a deficiency judgment. This trade-off is
particularly harsh to a mortgagor, in light of the six month tradeoff for the right to maintain an action for a deficiency judgment
underlying section 580.23. Finally, the Act fails to provide the
troubled farmer or homeowner with a "fresh start" once the relief
period expires.
The alternative approaches discussed in this Article could offer
271. Telephone interview with Mr. Joe Chrastil, Citizens Organizations Acting Together (COACT) (Dec. 22, 1983).
272. See Act of June 9, 1983, Pub. Act No. 83-547, § 7, 1983 Conn. Legis. Serv. Jan.
Sess. 1795, 1800 (West), as amendedby Act of June 29, 1983, Pub. Act No. 83-29, § 72, 1983
Conn. Legis. Serv. June Spec. Sess. 2194, 2235 (West), repunted in CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
ch. 547 app. at 300 (West Supp. 1984).
273. See 7 C.F.R. § 1951.313(b)(1)(i)-(iii) (1983).
274. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing 1984 legislation).
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more effective relief than the Act currently provides and merit
consideration by the legislature as it reviews the vitality of the Act.
Although the Act fails to provide comprehensive relief, it nevertheless represents a positive effort reflecting Minnesota's historically
275
strong concern for protection of real property owners.
275. In January 1984, the Attorney General's Office assembled statistics on the
number of petitions filed pursuant to the Act which sought relief from mortgage foreclosure and contract for deed termination. The statistics showed that approximately 150
petitions had been filed in less than seven months. See REPORT UPDATE: HOME PRESERVATION HOTLINE (Jan. 25, 1984) (on file at William Mitchell Law Review office). What
the statistics are unable to show is perhaps even more significant: the number of foreclosures or terminations worked out between the lender and the homeowner or farmer. The
Act has undoubtedly forced compromise rather than unilateral action.
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